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ABSTRACT

Using the theory of correspondence and contradiction, the author analyzes the interaction between socioeconomic and educational changes in Ethiopia from 1942 to 1974. An introductory section sets forth the principles of correspondence and contradiction, which refer to how the means of economic production determine conditions in the noneconomic "superstructure" of society and how the superstructure in turn acts on the means of production, creating contradictions between the two. Section 2 traces Ethiopia's major socioeconomic changes from 1941 to 1974, including the incorporation of the economy into the world market economy, economic stagnation, the emergence of foreign-dominated commercial farms and industries, and the deterioration of rural and urban living standards. The corresponding educational changes from 1942 to 1974 are discussed in section 3, which describes the succession of British- and American-inspired educational reforms and the mounting problems of unequal participation in education, maldistribution of qualified teachers, low education budgets, high dropout and failure rates, high unemployment among school graduates, and student antigovernment militancy. The concluding section reviews the contradictions between the economic and educational systems that contributed to the 1974 overthrow of the government. It also points out potential future contradictions. (Author/RW)

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# SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORMS IN ETHIOPIA (1942-1974) : CORRESPONDENCE AND CONTRADICTION

Desta Asayehgn

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# SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORMS IN ETHIOPIA (1942-1974): CORRESPONDENCE AND CONTRADICTION

## Section I

## INTRODUCTION

In Ethiopia the notion that schooling is the most important and effective instrument of economic development has received much attention. The central goal of many economists has been to forecast the manpower needs and estimate economic returns to investment in education. Those educators who hold firmly to the view that action on the educational plane can bring about social change have been concerned with the operationalization of educational objectives in behavioral terms and the evaluation of cognitive and affective educational outcomes. To date, little effort has been made by either economists or educators to assess how internally and externally generated socio-economic changes are being manifested in the schooling system. Nor has anyone attempted to study how the Ethiopian schooling system, in trying to perform its functions may exacerbate contradictions within the socio-economic structure.

Following the concepts of correspondence and contradiction, the purpose of this paper is to trace historically how changes in the Ethiopian educational system corresponded to changes in the socio-economic structure. Further, attempts will be made to examine dialectically how some unintended schooling outcomes have contradicted the stagnant economic situation in the country.

Before tracing the development of modern schooling in Ethiopia, a brief look into the principles of correspondence and contradiction is needed. The first section of this paper, therefore, surveys the major themes of correspondence and contradiction. In section two, the major socio-economic changes during the post-independence period (1941-1974) are presented. This will be followed by a discussion of the educational reforms that corresponded to the socio-economic changes of that period. Finally, some of the latent and manifest contradictions as reflected in the educational system are outlined.

The principles of correspondence and contradiction

In order to analyze the development of modern education in Ethiopia, an analytical framework based on the principles of correspondence and contradiction was adopted. Briefly stated, the principles of correspondence and contradiction refer to how the means of production determine conditions and practices in the superstructure and how the superstructure in turn reacts back on the economic base, creating antagonism between the two. (See Carnoy, 1974; Carnoy Levin, 1976; Carter, 1976; Bowles Gintis, 1977; Lange, 1962).

The means of production include (a) productive forces such as technology, skills, material resources, and sources of energy (water power, electricity and the like); and (b) productive relations, that is, the relationship between people engaged in producing material goods. Specifically, the latter refers to the relationship between the owners of capital and wage earners, or, in a feudal mode of production, the relationship between landlords and serfs or tenants. It also includes the relationship of workers to each other in the process of production.

Even though two or more different modes of production can exist and function at the same time, the historical development of human society can roughly be classified into six major modes of production, i.e., the Asiatic mode, primitive communism, the slave mode, the feudal mode, the capitalist mode, and the socialist mode. For our purpose in this paper, we need to describe the nature of the feudal and the capitalist modes of production.

In feudalism, the major productive force is land. Land can be owned privately or by royal families and monastic orders. Those who till the land are attached to it as serfs and cannot leave it at will. The landowners allot plots of land for their personal use, and in return the serfs are obliged to till the landowners' fields and pay as tribute part of the produce of the land allotted to them (Lange, 1962:18). The social relations of production are based on "forceful extraction of surplus from peasant producers, who may in legal terms be serfs or tenants, or even slaves, but who always share a common class constraint: they are tied to the landlord's spatial domain; they must deliver to him as much surplus as they are humanly and technologically capable of producing; and they must do so generations without end" (Blaunt, 1976:2).

In the capitalist mode of production, the means of production are owned by capitalist. The rest of the people work as "free" wage-labourers. The wages which the workers receive represent only a fraction of the surplus,

just enough to keep them at a subsistence level and allow them to reproduce themselves. Capitalists may own the means of production either individually or cooperatively (Lange, 1962).

The superstructure refers to the state apparatus, the school apparatus, the church apparatus, communication apparatus, ideology, culture and philosophy. As illustrated by Lange, the superstructure embraces,

> ...those conscious social relations (except conscious productive relations, for those are part of the base) and those social ideas and socio-psychological attitudes which are necessary for the existence of a given mode of production, which make possible the continuation of the existing production relations and which in particular, consolidate the established system of ownership of the means of production (1962:26).

The principles of correspondence

The principle of correspondence is based on the assumption that the superstructure adjusts itself to the needs of the economic base (that is, the productive forces and the relations of production) of a given period. In other words, when the economic base changes, factors within the superstructure which "are incompatible with the requirements of the new economic base change with it" (Lange, 1962:30). In fact, Engels (as quoted in Tucker, 1972) and Carter (1976) argue that even though there could be a reciprocal relationship between the superstructure and the economic base, in the "final instance" it is the economic base which determines the general practice in society and activities in the superstructure.

On the other hand, Althusser (Althusser (1971) and Lange (1962) argue that practices and remnants from former superstructures existed side by side with the practices of the predominant superstructures can have momentum of their own, and can negatively affect the existing mode of production. Taking schools as an example, we can demonstrate that schools controlled by the state can generally play a great role in the reproduction of the existing social relations of production. Traditionally, the central goals of civic education have been to build character, to instil obedience to rulers and laws, and to develop respect for political institutions and established authority. In feudal societies, for instance, the central aim of schools is to produce loyal and obedient citizens consistent with the existing feudal relations of production. Similarly in capitalist countries, in addition to equipping youngsters with vocational skills necessary to integrate them into

the economic system, schools also socialize their youngsters to be disciplined, independent and achievement oriented. The social relations between the staff members and the students replicate the hierarchy of division of labor. (See Althusser, 1971:132; Cohen/Lazerson, 1972).

The kind of schooling existing in class societies is not by any means homogenous. For instance, the kind of instruction received by working-class children differs from that received by the children of the capitalists and their functionaries. It differs in operations budget, the social relations among the teachers and students, and the personality characteristics which faculty members inculcate in the youngsters (see for example, Bowles/Gintis, 1977; Carnoy/ Levin, 1972; Carter, 1976; Althusser, 1971; Samaroo, 1977).

The aforementioned examples clearly illustrate that even though the training of youngsters is formally carried out at the superstructure level, the content of what is taught and the social relations existing between school personnel and the learners reflect to a great extent the conditions of the work place. Furthermore, the above examples demonstrate that centralized school systems facilitate the existing mode of production and receive their direction from the economic base.

However, even though there might be a relative conformity between the economic base and the superstructure, and institutions located at the superstructure can facilitate the tasks initiated from the economic base, it would lead to a mechanistic formulation to totally assume that it is the economic base which determines whatever happens at the superstructure. In fact, it could be argued that the superstructure can act independently and can have its own autonomy and at times contradict the economic base. For instance, remnants of Tsarist Russia's bureaucratic formalities and practices survived after the Soviet Union embarked on Socialism in 1917. (See for example, Althusser, 1971). Cultural values such as religious practices inherited from another superstructure can have a momentum force of their own in undermining the new mode of production when they exist side by side with the new superstructur

To elaborate on the above argument, some examples can be cited from the field of education. In a centralized system, public schools can be made to adjust themselves to the new mode of production but private schools, particularly those administered by religious denominations can continue operating independent of, and even in opposition to, the needs of the new mode of production. For instance, in Ethiopia it will be shown later that

the Orthodox Church and Quranic Schools functioned side by side with the western oriented schools even though their teachings were dysfunctional to the internally generated and imported economic forces.

Even in a centralized schools system, it is quite difficult and challenging to make teachers and learners strictly adhere to the message given by the new mode of production. For example, in China, before the Cultural Revolution was launched to purge the institutions whose practices were in conflict with the socialist mode of production, higher education institutions kept on producing experts and taught elite values which were not consonant with the predominant mode of production (Grossman, 1975).

Thus, to safeguard ourselves from "over determinism" and from a mechanistic outlook, especially when analyzing a transitional society such as Ethiopia, we will include remnants of the superstructure of former social formations in addition to looking at changes in the educational system which corresponded to changes in the socio-economic structure. However, before we discuss the development of modern education in Ethiopia, a brief discussion of the concept of contradiction is in order.

The principles of contradiction

It was demonstrated above that the principles of correspondence presume conformity between the superstructure and the economic base. In passing it is worth noting that the principles of correspondence also assume unity between productive forces and relations of production. As discussed before, advocates of this principle argue that even though there could be a reciprocal relationship (that is between the economic base and the superstructure on the one hand, and between productive forces and relation of production on the other hand) in the "final instance" it is the economic base which determines everything in the superstructure. The fact that the superstructure can have equal weight in affecting and generating changes in the economic base is either mentioned in passing or totally neglected. This kind of formulation is critized by Mao as follows:

> This is the mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role (1971:116).

The principle of correspondence can allow us to identify factors that can facilitate harmony or unity between the economic base and institutions in the superstructure; however, it overlooks contradictions that act as a sort of catalyst in bringing about change. As discussed by Carter "correspondence directs our theoretical vision toward what is to be changed: contradiction steers us toward where it can be changed and changing" (1976:58). Many kinds of contradictions can exist in a given system (for a detail discussion on contradiction see Mao 1971) however, for the purpose of this paper two types of contradiction - latent and manifest - are important. Latent contradiction refers to those tensions that exist between the economic base and the superstructure or between productive forces and relations of production. As its name indicates, it is not devastating and a system confronted with this kind of tension can maintain its stability by making adjustments in its structure. However, if latent contradiction is not handled when it arises, it can eventually be transformed into a manifest state. "Latent contradictions may become manifest and operate as barriers only after material conditions in the economy have developed sufficiently to uncover them" (Carter, 1976:55).

Stated in specific terms, contradiction between productive forces and relations of production arises when the interest of the owners of capital is diametrically opposed to the interst of those who sell their labour. For instance in feudal societies contradiction arises when a landlord wants to expropriate whatever is produced by a tenant. The tenant knowing that producing more means giving more to the landlords, keeps the productivity of the land to its minimum. Similarly, in capitalist countries capitalists through management want to maximize their profit by exploiting the workers. On the other hand, the workers, bored by alienation, act to lower the level of productivity.

Contradiction between the economic base and the superstruture arises when unforeseen factors occur in either the superstructure or the economic base. As mentioned above, generally educational institutions receive their purpose from the economic base. Either through their operation or in their output, schools mirror the economy. That is, when the economy changes, the instructional content, the social relations between staff members and students, and the quantity of school graduates change accordingly. Expansion of schools coincides with the growth of the economy. However, in some circumstances, schools might over-expand to accommodate popular demands or unforeseen factors (such as sudden increases in the cost of technology

or energy; recession or depression) might negatively affect the absorptive capacity of the economy. In such situations, schools can over-produce credentialled but unemployable labour resources. The over-supply of graduates relative to the absorptive capacity of the economy creates a contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure.

> The source of this contradiction is illustrated by Kravetz as follows: The onus may lie upon the fact of insufficient data available to educational planners, inertia on the part of educational authorities in the face of adequate data, insufficient process of orientation for students when data are available, or the persistence of traditional aspirations by students and their families regardless of data and orientation (1970:11).

Moreover, Kravetz argues that during the occurrence of business and trade recession special problems might arise for the schools. The continual output of employable graduates by schools might further depress the already saturated labour market and increase the number of credentialled unemployed, who are willing to work, but for whom industrial and other enterprises have no openings (1970:11).

The aforementioned examples illustrate that contradiction can either arise at the superstructure (that is, schools might over-produce unemployable graduates) or at the economic base when internally and externally generated economic factors disrupt the economy's ability to absorb those produced by schools. In the latter case, the source of contradiction is from the economic base.

In order for a system to exist and function properly, the contradiction between the superstructure and the economic base has to be resolved. Changes can originate either from the superstructure or the economic base. In the former, for instance, schools can be made to counteract the existing latent contradiction either by changing the mandatory entry age of school children (that is, raise the mandatory entry age from six to seven or eight so that planners can have time to identify future potential job opportunities) or give unnecessary training in new skills to youngsters in order to prolong their adolescence period. In such instances, training can be carried out either in formal schools or in special vocational training centers. The training centers may serve "cooling-out" functions until the economy recovers itself. For instance, Papagiannis (1977) argues that mobile trade training schools in Thailand and junior colleges in the United States were used as a sort of safety valve for social frustrations.

Minor adjustments could also be made at the economic base. For example, employers can change the credentialling requirement for job entry without changing the nature of the task to be performed or without expecting that there will be a major change in productivity or the quality of the work to be performed.

Adjustments within the superstructure and the economic base are made on the assumption that changing one opposing element can bring about unity or symetry. However, if the contradiction is manifest and the economy has reached a saturation point, beyond which it cannot be overhauled, then, the only alternative left for the existing mode of production to counteract the manifest contradiction is to dissolve itself and give way to a new mode of production. For instance, if the predominant mode of production is based on capitalism, it has to be transformed into a socialist mode of production where the means of production is socialized and administered either by the state on behalf of the masses or by a trustee representing workers and peasants.

To summarize, in order to analyze the development of modern schooling in Ethiopia, the analytical framework used in this study is based on the principles of correspondence and contradiction. By applying the principles of correspondence, we will try to examine changes in the educational system which have corresponded to the changes in the socio-economic system. On the other hand, applying the perspective of the principle of contradiction, we will try to examine how the Ethiopian eduational system, albeit unintended, has brought about both latent and manifest contradictions in the socio-economic structure.

To explore the extent to which the socio-economic system affected the educational system, it is necessary, first, to identify some of the salient changes in the Ethiopian socio-economic structure; next, to make explicit the accompanying educational developments; and finally, to examine the interrelations and tensions between the two using the principles of correspondence and contradiction.

## Section II

### THE POST-WAR CONDITION DEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION

With the restoration of Haile Selassie to the throne on May 5, 1941, Ethiopia regained its political independence from the fascist colonists. However, it was controlled by the British, and this normally independent country for all practical purposes became a semi-British protectorate, took shelter under the protective shield of British imperialism. British officials were appointed advisers in the government to ensure that Haile Selassie could not counter British interests. Upon the decline of British imperialism after the Second World War, however, British predominance in the Ethiopian politico-economic sphere faded out and was replaced by that of the United States of America and other capitalist countries, We will now consider these points in detail.

As mentioned above, considering themselves as liberators of the country, the British imperialist replaced the Italian colonists as the occupying power. In return for their military assistance during the Ethiopean resistance movement against fascist Italy and the f3 1/4 million economic aid given during the restoration period on January 31, 1942, the British asked for and were conceded enormous privileges in the internal affairs and international relations of the country. Some of the privileges accorded to the British were (1) the precedence of the British Ambassador over other foreign representatives, (2) the levying of taxes and allocation of expenditures in Ethopia with the prior approval of the British government, (3) the handling of the Ethopian administrator by British advisers, (4) the trial of all enemy war-crime suspects by British military tribunals, (5) the prohibition of Ethiopia from establishing trade relations with the Axis Powers

(i.e., Germany, Italy and Japan), (6) Allowing only British airlines to fly throughout the country, and (7) putting the area of the Addis Ababa Ababa-Djibouti railway, the Haud, the Ogaden and the Reserved area (i.e., a stretch of Ethiopian territory adjacent to French Somaliland) under British administration. Given all these privileges, "liberated" Ethiopia

> ...remained essentially under British control. British military units as part of the BMME (British Military Mission to Ethiopia) were present everywhere, as were British advisers. All communications, including the Emperor's personal correspondence and air and surface transport were controlled by them. Foreign airlines other than British were excluded... The East Africa shilling replaced the Italian lire and the traditional Ethiopian currency. Ethiopia was part of the sterling area. Goodyear, Goodrich or Firestone tires could be purchased only if they had been manufactured by their branches in England. All dollar exchange earned by exports had to be converted into pounds sterling... (Spencer, 1977:9. See also Schwab, 1972:35).

Ravaged by economic dislocation wrought by the Second World War, and in order to pacify those progressive Ethiopian who were opposed to the British presence in Ethiopia, Britain after three years of predominance in the Ethiopian politico-economic sphere modified the Treaty of 1942 by an Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of December 9, 1944. As discussed by Schwab, under the 1944 Agreement

> Ethiopia was permitted to appoint British advisers as the Ethiopian government sees fit. The direction was transferred to the Ethiopian government from the British. In addition, jurisdiction over British subjects was to be exercised by Ethiopian courts, and the British government relinquished control of the Franco-Ethiopian railway running from Addis Ababa to Djibouti. The agreement provided for the establishment of a British military mission to Ethiopia and until the termination of the agreement, the British military was permitted to administer the Ogaden region of Harar province (1972:35).

In 1948 Britain withdrew from the Ogaden. With the return of the Haud and the Reserved area in 1954 to the Ethiopian government, British privileges in the country were reduced.

Taking advantage of the deterioration of relations between Ethiopia and Britain, the United States started establishing economic and military relations with Ethiopia. Presented below is a brief review of how the Ethiopian economy became involved in dependent and subordinated relations with the United States through commerical ties, investments, economic assistance and the establishment of U.S. military bases and military advisory group.

After an American Economic Commission visited the country in 1944, Haile Selassie was promised a U.S. loan of Eth $7.5 million at 3 percent interest rate a year. A year later, Haile Selassie "briefly conferred with President Franklin Roosevelt on an American warship near Suez" (Lipsky, 1962:220). In 1946, an American, Mr. Blowers was appointed as the Governor of the State Bank of Ethiopia. As stated by John Spencer, Haile Selassie's chief adviser:

> In that year the East African Shilling was replaced by a new currency, the Ethiopian dollar. While that action did not free Ethiopia from the pound sterling; it laid the ground work for eventually detaching it and basing it on the U.S. dollar (1977:14).

The minting of the divisional coinage as well as the printing of the new paper currency was done at the U.S. mint in Philadelphia (Spencer, 1977:14).

With the implementation of President Truman's Point Four Program of technical assistance to less developed countries, on June 16, 1951, the United States government signed an agreement with Ethiopia whereby the U.S. gained full access to the exploitation of natural resources in the country. Initially, the basic aim of the Point Four Program in Ethiopia was to give economic assistance, scholarships and training to Ethiopian Personnel in the fields of education, agriculture and public health. However, later Ethiopia's potential in the realm of other economic resources attracted U.S. dollars with the force of a huge magnet, and the program

was expanded to include:

> An investigation of the economic potential of the land and water resources of the Blue Nile River Basin and the development of the Surveys and Water Resources Department for the Imperial Ethiopian Government.
>
> The Imperial Ethiopian Mapping and Geography Institute (was) established to develop and train an organization which will produce maps utilizing photogrammetric techniques, collect economic, political and physical geography data and compile the necessary maps to depict these data (Ethiopia Observer, December 1958:5).

As indicated in Table 1 in the six years from 1952 to 1959 the U.S. Government spent Eth. $57 million through the Point Four Program.

TABLE 1

Point Four Expenditures in Ethiopia 1952-1959

| Year | Expenditure (in thousands Eth. $)* |
|---|---|
| 1952 | 1,985 |
| 1953 | 1,552 |
| 1954 | 3,892 |
| 1955 | 6.707 |
| 1956 | 8.195 |
| 1957 | 9,052 |
| 1958 | 12,410 |
| 1959 | 13,342 |
| Total | 57,342 |

*Average exchange rate U.S. $1.00 = Eth $2.50

Source: The International Cooperation Administration as quoted in Getachew, 1971:133.

By 1970 Ethiopia was the foremost recipient of U.S. assistance to all African countries. She accounted for 65% of all United States

assistance to all African countries. That is, out of total of U.S. $18 million allotted to African countries in 1970, Ethiopia received U.S. $12 million compared to $1.08 million for Zaire, $100,000 for Ghana, $580,000 for Liberia, $200,000 for Libya, $800,000 for Morocco, $100,000 for Nigeria and $3 million for Tunisia (Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970: 1953). (See Table 2 for the amounts and purposes of credits from IBRD, IDA, USA, US-Export -Import Bank, and other U.S. agencies.

U.S. interest in Ethiopia was not limited to economic assistance and the feasibility for future U.S. investments but also involved military ties and the establishment of U.S. bases in the country. In 1950 and 1960, Ethiopia sent its troops to Korea and the Congo. In his testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. David Newson, the former Undersecretary for African Affairs, revealed that Ethiopia received large amounts of economic assistance from the United States because (it) "has on two occasions sent its force to participate in actions which are parallel with our own objectives at the time, once in Korea and once in the United Nations' efforts in the Congo" (1970: 1903).

In exchange for economic aid which trained and equipped three Ethiopian divisions of 6000 each, on May 1954, the U.S. asked for and was granted the right to build and maintain military bases in Ethiopia for twenty-five years. In 1954 the U.S. government opened a U.S. Army strategic communication base at Kagnew Station in Asmara, Eritrea. As stated by Spencer, the United States wanted the communications base at Amhara because:

> it was located in the tropics far from the north and south magnetic poles, the aurora borealis and magnetic storms, in a zone where the limited degree of seasonal variations between sunrise and sunset reduced the need for numerous frequency change. It was an important addition to the worldwide network of U.S. communications including the Philippines, Ethiopia, Morocco and Arlington, Virginia and could also serve the NATO area within Western Europe whenever electrical and magnetic disturbances upset communication in those higher latitudes (1977:22-23).

TABLE 2

IBRD, IDA, AID, EXIM-Bank and Other U.S. Loans to Ethiopia up to June 30, 1964

| Creditor | Maturity Period | Interest Rate | Purpose of Credit | Amount (in millions Eth. $) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) | | | | |
| | 1950-1971 | 4% | Highways | 12.5 |
| | 1951-1971 | 4% | Development Bank | 5.0 |
| | 1951-1971 | 4% | Telecommunications | 3.75 |
| | 1957-1977 | 4% | Highways (2nd project) | 37.5 |
| | 1961-1971 | variable | Development Bank | 5.0 |
| | 1962-1982 | 5% | Telecommunications | 7.25 |
| | 1964-1989 | 5 1/2 | Electric Power | 58.75 |
| International Development Association (IDA) | | | | |
| | 1961-2013 | N/A | Highways (3rd project) | 33.75 |
| United States Agency for International Development (USAID) | | | | |
| | -1981 | 3 1/2% | Airports | 50.625 |
| | 1961-1982 | 3 1/2% | Jet Aviation | 7.75 |
| | 1961-1974 | 3 1/2% | Highways(maintenance) | 9.0 |
| | 1961-1976 | 4% | Development Bank | 5.0 |
| U.S. Export-Import Bank | 1956-1977 | 5% | Civil Aviation | 24.75 |
| U.S. Bank | 1962-1969 | 5% | Jet Aircraft | 29.4 |
| U.S. Government | 1949-1954 | none | - - - - | 0.5 |
| U.S. Government | 1962-1978 | 3% | Raw cotton for textile companies | 3.39 |

Source: Ethiopian Observer, as quoted in Ahorja; 1966:317.

On June 1, 1970, more than three thousand U.S. military personnel and their dependents were stationed at Kagnew (Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970: 1913).

Following Haile Selassie's visit to the United States in May, 1954, and Vice President Richard Nixon's visit to Ethiopia in 1956, military assistance started flowing to Ethiopia. A brief summary of the main contents of the Ethio-U.S. military agreements of the 1960's is presented below.

In 1960 the United States agreed to equip and train the Fourth Division of the Ethiopian Army, gave the Ethiopean Navy a seaplane tender (AUP) and also "reaffirmed its continuing interest in the security of Ethiopia and the opposition to any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia" (Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970: 1905).

In 1962, the U. S. Government provided ammunition and armored personnel carriers to the Ethiopian army. The Air force portion of the agreement was to provide T-28D, T-86, and T-33 aircraft and to continue support of the T-28A and F-86 squadrons. The Navy portion of the commitment was to provide one LCM (Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970: 1907).

In 1963, the U.S. agreed to reorganize the Ethiopian Air Force; the Ethiopian Navy was provided with 40-foot Coast Guard Utility Boats. In 1964, Ethiopian Airforce was promised a squadron of 12 F-s aircraft (Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970: 1907).

As shown in Table 3, between the years 1953 and 1970, U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia amounted to Eth $397.5 million. U.S. counter-ensurgency training teams instructed the Ethiopian army; between 1953-70 a total of 2813 Ethiopian officers were trained in the United States at total cost of approximately Eth $17 million (Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970: 1915).

TABLE 3

U.S Military Assistance to Ethiopia 1953 - 1970

| Year | Eth-$ (million) |
|---|---|
| 1953-61 | 101.25 |
| 1962 | 26.25 |
| 1963 | 26.25 |
| 1964 | 25.75 |
| 1965 | 20.75 |
| 1966 | 26.75 |
| 1967 | 22.50 |
| 1968 | 43.50 |
| 1969-70 | 104.50 |
| | 397.50 |

Source: Compiled from the Agency for International Development as quoted in Getachewe, 1971:136 and U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970.

It is worth noting that U.S. economic and military aid to Ethiopia was not a gesture of good will, to enhance the development of Ethiopia, but was precisely geared to facilitate capitalist expansion - i.e., to protect markets and investments and to secure cheap raw materials. For instance, after the U.S. government, through the Point Four Program and other forms of economic assistance, paved the way for investment and assured the safety of American investors, many American firms which were desperately looking for investment outlets rushed to Ethiopia. Of course, it should be added that American firms were also encouraged to flock to Ethiopia after Haile Selassie promulgated a protectionist policy which favoured the private investors.

As the passage quoted below clearly indicates, Haile Selassie welcomed foreign investors with open arms, in a speech on Addis Ababa Radio on 11 October, 1962:

> It has for long been a part of the tradition of Ethiopia to welcome foreigners and safeguard their rights and interests during their stay here. In the case especially of these foreigners who have invested capital on development projects in this country, apart from working in cooperation on the part of both Our Government officials and Our people, there has never been a case in Ethiopia's history when the property of a foreigner has been unlawfully confiscated. This is a source of pride for Ethiopia. Ethiopia will at all times welcome foreign investors who may be willing to employ their money for development works, either in partnership with Ethiopians or as private entrepreneurs (Ethiopia Observer, 1966:286).

In the Investment Guarantee Agreement signed by the U.S. and Ethiopia in August 1962, every American investor was further assured by the U. S. government that "he will be protected up to the amount specified in the guarantee from loss through expropriation, inconvertability, or from loss by reason of war" (Ethiopia Observer, 1966:291).

Through an investment protectionist policy known as the "Investment Decree, 1963" the Ethiopian government promised five major types of benefits to investors. The policy was put into effect in September 1963. Included in this were: exemptions from income tax, for a period of five years, for enterprises whose capital was Eth $200,000 or more; import duty relief for capital goods; export duty relief for capital goods; export duty relief for manufactured finished goods in order to enable them to compete in the international market; the remittance of profits of foreign investors to their countries of origin; acquisition of land required for the establishment of industrial, agricultural, mining, transport and touristic enterprises (Ethiopian Economic Review, 1963: 94-96).

Blaug, who is at times less than critical of foreign investments in developing countries, thought of the Investment Decree as excessive and

detrimental to the Ethiopian economy. As he puts it, "although a certain degree of protection is useful to foster infant industries the level of protection in Ethiopia seems excessive. Thirty percent protection has been found to be sufficient for many infant industries in UC's and a 50 percent protection is high by international standards--Protection in Ethiopia exceeds 50 per cent." (1973:7).

As Table 4 shows, while industrial and agricultural machinery for foreign investors and the comprador class were exempted from duty tax, most of the tools commonly used by labourers, artisans and small firms were heavily taxed.

TABLE 4

Custom Tariffs in Ethiopia for Some Capital Goods

| Item | Tariff |
|---|---|
| Agricultural machinery and parts thereof | Free |
| Electrical machinery for power generated | Free |
| Machine tools | Free |
| Tools: commonly used by labourers, artisans and mechanics | |
| Hammer | $3.20 per piece |
| Axe | 2.50 per piece |
| Pike | 2.50 per piece |
| Chisel | 1.60 per piece |
| Pliers | 1.60 per piece |
| Pincette | 1.50 per piece |
| Screw drivers 4 - 7 & 10 | 1.00 per piece |
| Shovel | 2.50 per piece |
| Masons spoon | 1.20 per piece |
| Sickal | 1.50 per piece |
| prime movers, i.e., gas engines, oil engines, steam engines, hydraulic steam turbine, etc | Free |
| Road and farm tractors and trailers | Free |
| Bonds & belting of all kinds for driving machinery | Free |

Source for Table 10: Ministry of Finance, as quoted in Blaug "Report of the Exploratory Employment Policy Mission in Ethiopia, 1973: 87.

As expected with the full implementation of Haile Selassie's liberal protectionist policy, many Americans and other capitalist investors came to the country and were granted concessions in the industrial, agricultural and mining sectors of the economy. To mention only a few of the major investors, a 50-year monoply concession was granted to Sinclair Oil Corporation to explore for oil in the country; Beh, Tenneco, and Whitestone and Louisiana land and Exploration Company (American) were granted concessions to exploit oil and gas, the former in the South-eastern and the latter in the eastern part of the country; the exploitation of potash and saline deposits in the Danakil Depression fell under the domain of two U.S. companies, Ralph M. Parsons and Seatankers. However, since Parsons Company had potash mines at Saskatchew in Canada, Ethiopia's potash deposits were not fully exploited. In his explanation of why Parsons and Company never mixed Ethiopia's potash deposit, Bondestan makes the following observations,

> By extending their activities and producing potash in Ethiopia, they would cause the world market price of potash to fall, thereby affecting the profitability of the mines in Canada. Ethiopians who have studied the matter are of the opinion that it is for this very reason that Parsons and Company let the mines in Ethiopia lie idle. India pays a high price for imported potash. The Indian Government has therefore asked the Ethiopian official in the ministry of Mines. The Indian Government is willing to pay any price to start potash production in Ethiopia to be exported to India; but the arm of the Ethiopian Government is being twisted: breaking the contract with Parsons and Company might threaten Ethiopian trade relations with U.S.A. (to which 50% of all exports go)./1975:134-36).

In the 1960's many American companies "invested large sums of money in three other areas of the Ethiopian economy; the production of coffee, construction of hotels and forestry" (Ahooja, 1966: 287). For example, about seventy

percent of the share in the Ethiopian-American Coffee Company was owned by American companies. In Ahooja's words the coffee estate owned by the Ethiopian American Coffee Company "spread over 10,000 acres of land with some two million coffee trees and a nursery containing over half a million seedlings. This is one of the largest coffee plantations in Ethiopia and the only one with an all weather airstrip capable of handling DC-3's" (1966: 287). The largest hotel in the country, which was constructed with a loan procured from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, is by and large owned by Hilton Hotels International. Fifty percent of the paper industry in the country was owned by two U.S. Companies, Parsons and Whittemore. An American Company, International Industrial Development Consultants, Inc. (INDEVCO) was granted concessions to start a lumbering project for logging of large acres of forest land for timber export Ahooja, 1966:287).

From its inception in 1946, the Ethiopian Airlines was a dumping ground for surplus DC-47's parked at the edge of Payne Field outside Cairo and has been under the monoply of the Trans World Airlines. As stated by Geiger "the Ethiopians regard EAL as an Ethiopian company even though most of its top officials are from the United States and TWA is responsible for its operation" (1959:62; see also Spencer, 1977:15).

Since 1967 many American companies have been receiving regular financial support from USAID and IBRD to explore investment opportunities in Ethiopia, Bondestam makes the following observations:

> Actually, it is hardly possible to distinguish American Companies from assistance agencies such as USAID and IBRD. Their interests are closely linked and these two agencies, probably together with the few others, should therefore logically be included in an enumeration of foreign commercial interests in Ethiopia. They do not invest directly, but the impression they give is that their task is to prepare the ground for a penetration of American business capital. Moreover, they tie more local capital into so-called development projects than pure companies do. This

> means that given the dependence on foreign capital through "aid" local capital, which would otherwise have been available for investing in improvements for the Ethiopian people, is very often "lost" in development alienated projects (1975:133).

Though the hegemony of U.S. capital over other investments in Ethiopia was substantial, starting in the 1960's a few British, Japanese, Indian, Italian, Dutch and Israeli investors were granted permission to start investments in the country.

Being unsure of their situation in Kenya and the Sudan after these two countries won their independence from Britain, and using Haile Selassie's liberal foreign investment protectionist policy, a few British firms began feasibility studies for future investments and eventually got involved in three major activities: cotton, meat production and pharmaceutical factory. For instance, Mitchell Cotts Ltd was given land lease to grow cotton in Tendaho. As stated by Ahooja:

> In 1960, almost hesitantly, a few British investors bought shares in Tendaho. With the improvement of conditions of cotton crops and investment in agriculture research, the cotton yield rose from 200 pounds per acre to 800 pounds within a few years. As a result, the capital of Tendaho was increased from an initial Eth $4 million to Eth $14 million (1966:287).

After the full implementation of Haile Selassie's Investment Decree in 1964, the International Packers (Chicago and London) started a slaughterhouse, the National Meat Corporation of Ethiopia, in which the Ethiopian government owned only 24% of the share of capital. Smith and Nephew Associated Companies, London (SANACO) was given 50% of the share capital in the Ethiopian Drugs Manufacturing Company (Ahooja:1966:280).

The Japanese capitalists were given major concessions in the textile and metal processing factories. Three Japanese companies, Toyo Rayon Co., Sakai Textile Manufacturing Co., and Mitsuisui Shoji Kaisha Ltd., owned half of the share capital in the Ethio-Japanese Synthetic Textiles, S.C.

(Bondestam, 1975:135). The largest Cotton Company, the Cotton Company of Ethiopia, was 50% owned by a group of Japanese farms - The Sabean Utility Corporation (SUC), "which also has a share in the Fibre Company of Ethiopia" (Bondestam, 1975:135). The Sabean Utility Corporation was given the metal factory at Akaki. Similarly, another Japanese mining firm, the Nippon Mining Company was given copper concession at Debaroa in Eritrea. As stated by Bondestam:

> Nippon has 49% of the shares and the Ethiopian government the remaining 51%. A condition for the Japanese investment was that the Ethiopian Government arrange the loans and stand as the sole guarantor. In practice this means that Nippon brings the technology to Ethiopia and returns to Japan with the copper - at a rate considerably below the world market price (1975: 134).

Since 1954 a Dutch Company HVA (Handels Vereniging Amsterdam) has been involved in the plantation and production of sugar at Wonji and Shoa, and later it extended its operation to Metahara. Though the project initially started as a joint venture between the Dutch firm and the Ethiopian Government, there is some evidence that HVA was the exclusive owner of the sugar plantation and sugar factory. For example, until 1974 the Ethiopian Government owned only 10% of the shares, and HVA was allowed to remit 10 percent of the invested capital yearly and 15 percent of its annual profits (Bondestam, 1974: 432).

Other major foreign investments in the country were represented by the French, Indian, Swiss, Israelis and Italians. More than 50% of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway is owned by and operated by the Compaignie du Chemin de Fer Franco-Ethiopian de Djibouti a Addis Ababa. The Indian capitalists own the Indian Ethiopian Textile at Akaki (Shoa). The director of Birla Brokers Ltd. Company (BBLC) "is simultaneously both responsible for the operation of the state-owned Bahr Dar Textile Mills and the director of one

of the largest distribution firms in textile, namely the Indian Shantilal and Company Ethiopian Ltd., Moreover, BBLC is partly associated with the Indian firm, Messrs Duncan Brothers and Co., Ltd., which has 50% of the shares in National Textiles (Bondestam, 1975:136). The Swiss and Israelis invested in meat packing and canning and owned a large plantation of about 2000 hectares at Abadir. The Italians owned textile factories and enumerable large plantations in Eritrea and had a plantation at Nura Era in the Awash Valley.

Against this background of the establishment of transnational companies, let us now eeview the impact of economic assistance and loans (in 1974 alone Ethiopia received a loan of Etl $472.7 million from the United States, the World Bank, the European Community, Germany and other European countries. For details, see, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1976: 128)*, and foreign investments on economic development (stagnation) and improvement (deterioration) in the standard of the Ethiopian masses.

Taking into account the amount of economic assistance and the massive dosage of loans which Ethiopia has been receiving from various sources during the last two and a half decades, one might have expected enhancement in the country's economic development and improvements in the living conditions of the Ethiopian masses. Similarly, with the huge amount of foreign investments in the country one might have assumed that these investments would have created productive employment opportunities for the Ethiopian people and improved the productive capacities of the country's economic resources. However, contrary to one's expectations, we note the following:

*Even though the USSR, China and other communist governments have made official loans and grants to Ethiopia, they are not discussed in this paper because they were not investments for profit.

1. A chronic unfavourable balance of trade.
2. A stagnation in the Ethiopian economy and an increasing penetration by and dependence on international financial institutions, particularly in the United States.
3. An increasing deterioration of the standard of living of the Ethiopian working class and the peasantry. The following section will briefly discuss the problems outlined.

Ethiopia's Foreign Trade

Ethiopia's trade patterns with its major capitalist partners have been based primarily on an exploitative relationship. Table 5 indicates that the country had a persistent trade deficit in 23 out of the last 28 years. It had a minor visible favourable balance of trade in 1951, 1953, 1954, 1957; and after 15 years of chronic deficit, we observe that in 1973 there was a surplus of Eth $53 million because of an increase in world market prices of raw products and food. The irony of the matter, however, was that with the 1973/74 famine over 500,000 persons are said to have died in Wollo and Tigrai provinces, whereas the 'official' trade statistics show a net export surplus for cereals, oil seeds and pulses of 203,900 MT in 1973, the largest export surplus in any year since 1962" (Holmberg, 1977:9).

It is also interesting to note that after the full implementation of the Investment Decree of 1963, the value of both imports and exports has increased substantially. However, a careful examination of the commodities imported indicates that in 1972 alone about 38 percent of the imports were duty free - capital goods such as machinery, industrial inputs and manufactured goods. About 32 percent of imports were consumer goods, such as private cars, whisky, and cream butter, deemed important for the foreign capitalists and the national bourgeoisie (See Table 6).

TABLE 5

Ethiopian Imports, Exports and Balance of Trade 1946 - 1973 (in millions of Ethiopian dollars)

| Year | Imports | Exports | Balance of Trade |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1946 | 94.9 | 76.2 | - 18.7 |
| 1947 | 121.2 | 98.7 | - 22.5 |
| 1948 | 124.0 | 96.6 | - 27.4 |
| 1949 | 119.1 | 94.0 | - 25.1 |
| 1950 | 105.5 | 91.3 | - 14.2 |
| 1951 | 147.4 | 151.9 | + 4.5 |
| 1952 | 161.9 | 131.4 | - 30.5 |
| 1953 | 137.9 | 169.4 | + 31.5 |
| 1954 | 160.1 | 160.3 | + 0.2 |
| 1955 | 168.0 | 162,2 | - 5.8 |
| 1956 | 157.1 | 151.4 | - 5.7 |
| 1957 | 178.4 | 192.0 | + 13.6 |
| 1958 | 193.6 | 156.8 | - 36.8 |
| 1959 | 208.9 | 179.2 | - 29.7 |
| 1960 | 219.3 | 192.6 | - 26.7 |
| 1961 | 235.6 | 188.7 | - 46.9 |
| 1962 | 257.3 | 199.5 | - 57.8 |
| 1963 | 276.4 | 223.4 | - 52.7 |
| 1964 | 307.6 | 262.5 | - 45.1 |
| 1965 | 375.7 | 289.8 | + 85.9 |
| 1966 | 404.3 | 277.0 | -127.3 |
| 1967 | 357.4 | 252.7 | -104.7 |
| 1968 | 432.5 | 266.0 | -166.5 |
| 1969 | 388.3 | 298.1 | - 90.2 |



(continued)

TABLE 5 (continued)

| Year | Imports | Exports | Balance of Trade |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1970 | 429.1 | 305.9 | -123.2 |
| 1971 | 469.5 | 314.1 | -155.4 |
| 1972 | 435.6 | 387.3 | -48.3 |
| 1973 | 448.2 | 501.2 | + 53.0 |

Source: Central Statistical Office, Ethopia Statistical Abstract 1960-1972

TABLE 6

Ethiopian Major Imports 1966-1972

| Commodity | Percentage | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
| Capital goods | 42.6 | 40.1 | 47.3 | 33.3 | 31.1 | 34.1 | 38.4 |
| Consumer goods | 30.6 | 28.9 | 22.7 | 35.4 | 36.4 | 32.5 | 31.6 |
| Fuel | 6.8 | 8.8 | 6.2 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 9.4 | 8.3 |
| Other | 20.0 | 22.2 | 23.8 | 24.0 | 25.5 | 24.1 | 21.7 |

Source: Compiled from Economic Commission for Africa: Summaries of Economic Data, Ethiopia, 1969 & 1973

As indicated in Table 7 for the last eight-year period about 76% of the imported goods came from Italy, Japan, West Germany, United Kingdom and U.S.A.

TABLE 7

Ethiopia's Imports by Country of Origin 1966-1973

| Country of Origin | Percentage | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 |
| Italy | 24.2 | 24.5 | 22.1 | 19.3 | 20.1 | 19.8 | 19.6 | 18.5 |
| Japan | 16.3 | 17.6 | 11.6 | 13.6 | 18.2 | 18.1 | 18.2 | 16.7 |
| West Germany | 13.9 | 18.1 | 13.9 | 18.0 | 16.9 | 13.6 | 12.8 | 14.4 |
| United Kingdom | 11.4 | 10.0 | 11.6 | 12.6 | 9.2 | 11.5 | 11.3 | 11.6 |
| U.S.A. | 10.3 | 12.2 | 22.9 | 12.6 | 10.5 | 11.3 | 11.0 | 10.6 |
| All other countries | 23.9 | 17.6 | 17.9 | 23.9 | 25.1 | 25.7 | 27.1 | 28.7 |

Source: Compiled from Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data, Ethiopia 1969 & 1973

Ethiopia's export trade is largely dependent upon agricultural products. As shown in Table 8, during the eight-year period, coffee accounted for over 60% of Ethiopia's total exports, followed by hides and skins, oil seeds, live animals and meat, fruits and vegetables. However, in 1970, 1971 and 1972, 79%, 75% and 70%, respectively, of exported coffee was sold in the United States (See statistical Abstract, 1972:108). As observed by Assefa and Eshetu, "Ethiopia's dependence on the United States for its coffee market" can cause serious damage to the economy if for some reasons, political or otherwise, the United States stops or cuts down on its coffee imports from Ethiopia. The whole economy lies at the mercy of a single unreliable market," (1969: 61).

As shown in Table 9, over 80% of Ethiopia's total export value goes to seven countries. However, for the last eight years, the U.S. has been Ethiopia's biggest trading partner. Over 40% of Ethiopian yearly export goods have been sold in the United States followed by West Germany and Italy. It is worth noting at this juncture that Ethiopia's import-export firms

were dominated by foreigners. For instance, in 1964 about 77% of the foreign capitalists were engaged in import-export activities, the remaining 23% were Ethiopian (Economic Review, 1966:39).

TABLE 8

Ethiopia's Major Exports 1966-1973

| Commodity | Percentage | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 |
| Coffee | 62.0 | 60.8 | 64.8 | 66.2 | 68.7 | 62.8 | 51.9 | 42.3 |
| Hides & Skins | 14.2 | 13.0 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 13.5 | 15.3 |
| Oil seeds, etc. | 8.6 | 10.0 | 9.1 | 8.8 | 10.8 | 10.3 | 13.7 | 11.6 |
| Live animals and meat | 3.7 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 5.5 | 5.7 |
| Fruits and nuts | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 0.7 |
| Vegetables | 9.5 | 9.6 | 1.0 | 9.2 | 6.8 | 8.9 | 8.5 | 18.1 |
| Sugar | - | - | - | - | - | 1.5 | 2.6 | 3.7 |
| Oil seeds cake | - | - | - | - | - | 2.0 | 1.8 | 2.5 |

Source: Compiled from Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data, Ethiopia 1969 & 1973

To summarize, Ethiopia's foreign trade is characterized by an unfavourable balance of trade. In order to cover deficits, the Ethiopian economy has depended on foreign loans and economic assistance; foreign investors were invited to do business in the country under generous conditions. An analysis of the major components of Ethiopia's foreign trade reveals that in line with the existing international division of labor, Ethiopia has specialized in the production of primary goods. For its imports it is largely dependent on Italy (this might reflect Italy's trade with Eritrea rather than with Ethiopia proper, since being a former colony of Italy, there are a large number of Italians living in Eritrea); for its exports it is highly dependant on the United States.

TABLE 9

Ethiopia's Exports by Country of Origin 1966-1973

| Country of origin | Percentage | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 |
| U.S.A | 49.1 | 49.2 | 37.3 | 46.7 | 54.8 | 49.1 | 41.5 | 36.2 |
| West Germany | 6.3 | 6.1 | 9.2 | 10.7 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 10.6 |
| Italy | 10.2 | 9.5 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 9.6 | 9.4 |
| Affan & Tasar | 3.9 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 7.1 | 5.7 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 8.4 |
| Saudi Arabia | 6.0 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 7.5 |
| Japan | 4.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 8.2 | 6.7 |
| Netherlands | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 4.9 |
| All others | 17.1 | 18.2 | 17.9 | 14.2 | 10.3 | 12.8 | 16. | 16.3 |

Source: Compiled from Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data, Ethiopia, 1969 & 1973

Ethiopia's chronic commercial dependence, particularly on the U.S., has become increasingly obvious since over 70 per cent of the total coffee exported, the sole source of Ethiopia's foreign exchange, is sold in the United States. Moreover, the following discussion will show that despite the massive dosage of foreign aid and grants and the establishment of transnational companies, what we have observed in the Ethiopian economy during the 1968-73 period was a chronic stagnation.

Economic stagnation.

In addition to the unfavourable balance of trade, we observe that for the last seven years (that is, from 1966/7 to 1972/3 over 24 per cent of the Ethiopian yearly budgetary revenue,, on the average has been derived from technical assistance and foreign loans. The coverage of the budget deficit

with economic assistance and loans clearly manifests that the economy had been dependent on aid donors. Moreover, Table 10 clearly shows that the country had serious problems with repayments to foreign creditors. For instance, in 1973 Ethiopia's outstanding foreign debt amounted to Eth $585.9 million, of which 44 percent was to IBRD and IDA and 31 percent was to the United States. Moreover this was an increase of 81 percent over that of 1967.

TABLE 10

Ethiopia's External Debt 1967-1973 (in million Eth.$)

| Agency or country | Dec 1967 | Dec 1968 | Dec 1969 | June 1970 | Dec 1972 | Dec 1973 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IBRD & IDA | 122.9 | 140.56 | 145.28 | 166.56 | 225.4 | 256.9 |
| U.S.A | 108.7 | 145.36 | 149.10 | 156.89 | 177.8 | 180.0 |
| U.S.S.R. | 35.15 | 37.19 | 37.59 | 34.03 | 24.2 | 20.5 |
| Netherlands | 23.37 | 18.48 | 16.62 | 12.71 | 3.0 | --- |
| Yugoslavia | 18.04 | 15.75 | 13.42 | 10.95 | 3.8 | 2.3 |
| Italy | 2.66 | 13.30 | 23.60 | 55.38 | 63.8 | 51.7 |
| West Germany | 9.08 | 8.17 | 9.37 | 10.44 | 26.2 | 33.5 |
| All others | 5.01 | 4.20 | 21.68 | 32.91 | 44.9 | 41.0 |
| Total | 323.92 | 383.04 | 417.06 | 479.87 | 569.1 | 585.9 |

Source: Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data, Ethiopia 1968 & 1973

An analysis of the Gross Domestic Product(GDP) for the last ten years also reveals that the rate of output growth in Ethiopia declined from 4.8 percent in 1963-68 to 3.6 percent in 1968-73. The rate of growth of per capita gross national product was 1.0 in 1968-73 compared to 2.3 in 1963-68 (United Nations, 1975:60). Economic stagnation in Ethiopia during the period 1968-73 reflects in part the worsening terms of trade of Ethiopia with its trade

partners and the reduction of agricultural outputs. For instance, agriculture, which is supposed to engage about 90 percent of the population, grew at the rate of 2.1 percent per annum over the past ten years; on the other hand, the population is believed to have increased at the rate of 2.4 to 2.6 per cent per year (See Bäàug, 1973). Furthermore, it can be argued that the relations which were established through foreign assistance, foreign investments, and international trade contributed to Ethiopia's subordination and dependence:

1. Ethiopia was inserted into an imperialist chain through the establistment of U.S. military bases, loans and economic assistance grants, and military training programs.

2. This politico-economic and military dependence on imperialist countries, championed by the United States, was accelerated and consolidated in the 1960's after Haile Selassie pronounced an open door policy for foreign investments.

3. Ethiopia's economic dependence is characterized by an unfavourable balance of trade and the nature of its imports and exports. In conformity with the international division of labor it has specialized in agricultural products of which over 70 percent of its coffee, the single export crop is sold in the United States. For its technoglcal imports it has heavily depended on the Western European countries and the United States.

4. In order to cover the chronic trade and budget deficit, Ethiopia's development has been oriented to the external world-economic assistance, loans and capital inflow from abroad. For instance, for the last seven years on the average 24 percent of the public revenue was procured from external loans. This helped Haile Selassie's corrupt government to stay afloat.

5. Finally, dependence on trade and foreign investment has resulted not only in technological dependence but also has produced cultural dependence. For the welfare and comfort of the national bourgeoisie the country was forced to adopt modes of consumption and behavior characteristic of the imperialist countries. As shown above, for the last seven years over 30 percent of the imports (on the average) were consumer goods such as private cars, whisky and brandy, cream butter, etc. for the comprador class while the peasants starved to death. (see also Admassu, 1978 and Addis, 1975).

With the existing economic stagnation in the country the most hard hit were the peasants and the workers.

The condition of the peasants and workers

It was demonstrated above that the massive dosage of economic assistance and foreign loans, and Haile Selassie's liberal Investment Decree of 1963 neither contributed to Ethiopia's economic development nor counteracted the chronic imbalance of trade which the country had been faced with for the last 16 years. We also saw that during the period 1967-73 Ethiopia's indebtedness to foreign creditors increased substantially because the foreign investors were over-pricing the imported capital goods in order to maximize their profits.

In this dependent economic system there was hardly any improvement in the living conditions of the urban and rural proletariat. The investments did not generate productive employment for the Ethiopian masses. The urban proletariat was hard hit due to high unemployment in the cities. For instance, in 1970 open unemployment in the towns was around 5 to 10 percent of the labor force (Blaug; 1973:11). Similarly, the effects of the investments in the rural areas did not trickle down to the peasantry. Most of the tenants were

forced to leave the farmlands with the establishment of large scale commercial farms. Moreover, despite the introduction of commercial farms, for the last ten years the agriculture sector grew at only 2.1 percent while the population is estimated to have increased at the rate of 2.4 to 2.6 per cent per annum. As stated by Blaug, "...the recent growth of agricultural output below the growth of population implies a progressively worsening situation of the great majority of the population, and particularly for the poorest members of society (1973:5). In 1972, the average income obtained from agriculture, estimated on the basis of sector G.D.P. and population was about Eth $75 per year (See Blaug, 1973:23).

It was only the foreign investors, the national bourgeoisie (that is, the landed autocracy, those who held offices in the administrative apparatus who received land grants from Haile Selassie, the rich merchants and the capital-owning agriculturally skilled persons who contracted land from the absentee landlords), who benefitted from the investments and the free duties on fuel, income tax and capital goods.

With the introduction of mechanized farming by the foreign capitalists and the national bouregeoisie (for example, in 1970, the feudal autocrat, Sultan Ali Mirah, had a commercial farm on 14,200 hectares of land) The peasants and the pastrolists who lived in the Awash Valley were either pushed aside into the arid areas or evicted from their land and forced to migrate to face unemployment, starvation and possibly death in the urban areas.

After the Dutch, British, Italian and Israelis gained access to the Awash Valley through concessions (i.e., in 1970, the Dutch, British, Italian and Israelis owned 10,840, 8,200, 2,000 and 2,800 hectares respectively of cultivated land) Any of the Afars, a group of pastoralists who lived in the area for centuries, were pushed aside to the periphery or totally evicted from the land. For instance, after H.V.A. was granted a concession to plant and

process sugar at Wonji and Shoa and later at Metahaya many of the Afars were forced to leave their river-watered pastures without compensation. Similarly, with the development and preservation of wild animals in the upper portions of the Awash Valley for tourists, the Kereyn and Ittu Oromos were driven away from their land. To make matters worse, those Afars who lived within the proximity of the sugar plantation lost many of their cattle because HVA was discharging chemicals into the river and was indiscriminately spraying various insectitides (i.e., Endrin or D.D.T. compounds) on the pastures (Bondestam, 1974: 428-29).

Experience from CADU, (Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit, initiated in 1967 in Chilalo, Arusi Province with the assistance of the Swedish government) WADU (Welamo Agricultural Development Unit started in 1970 with the assistance of I.D.A.), the Bako Minimum Package Project (in Wellega) and the Setit Humera (Begeonder) both financed by the World Bank), clearly shows that the peasants who lived in these areas were evicted from their land. For example, CADU was established with the sole purpose of improving the standard living conditions of small farmers at Chilalo; however, with the establishment of mechanized farming the price of land skyrocketed, the credit system unilaterally favoured the rich farmers and in 1969 and 1970 alone more than 500 tenants were evicted. As stated by Stahl, it is believed that some of the evicted tenants had moved to nearby areas while the majority had left Arussi Province for southern Shoa, Bale and Hararge Provinces in the "belief and hope that in these places there was land available for cultivation"(1973: 7-8).

At Bako, with the establishment of comprehensive package projects, many tenants were evicted without compensation. As stated by Stahl,

> when I visited Bako in May 1972, 107 tenant families (approximately 500 individuals) had been informed by the entrepreneurs that their tenancy relationship was to be terminated They were threatened with immediate eviction. Within a year, land

> which had been producing food crops for local consumption (maize and sorghum) was made to grow haricot beans in response to the high world market price (1973:31, see also Abdul Majid, 1976:19).

Alienation of land from the peasantry was not only limited to the commercial farms but it was also quite prevalent in most of the regions incorporated by Menalik II. As mentioned in Section II of this paper, with the expansion of the Ethiopian Empire at the close of the nineteenth century to the South, Southwest and Southeast, the natives were expropriated from their land and were forced to work for the settlers. The alienated land was distributed among the conquerors, the Orthodox Church, the royal family and those indigenous elites who proclaimed their loyalty to the central government. As described by Ellis:

> Armed with rifles obtained from the Italians and French, Menelik's armies rapidly defeated a host of kingdoms which had fought the Empire to a standstill for centuries. The conquered lands were split up into gasha units of from 80 to 100 acres. Generally, one-third was set aside for local leaders and two thirds were divided between soldiers, governors and the church. Peasants in these lands were allocated to officials in accordance with rank, soldiers receiving from two to five families each, while governors were given hundreds (1976: 282-283).

Since 1941 several proclamations relating to land taxation and ownership were issued by Haile Selassie's Government ( for the main contents of the 1941, 1942, 1944, 1947 and 1967 land proclamations, see Markakis, 1974:118-129). Being aware of the deleterious effects of an outmoded tenure system, the government established in 1961 a Special Land Reform Committee to assess the land tenure situation in the country. In 1964 a land Reform Authority was created to implement some of the measures suggested by the Land Reform Committee. In 1966 the Land Reform Authority was elevated to the rank of Ministry of Land Reform and Administration. However, a national Sample Survey, 1966-68, conducted by the Central Statistical Office clearly shows that there was a

continuous expropriation of the peasants and ownership of land was concentrated in the hands of a few landowners. For instance, in 1968 it was found that about 75 percent of the total areas in Hararge Province alone belonged to 0.2 percent of the landowners (Blaug, 1973:125).

Interestingly enough, not only did the landowners defy the government's proclamations and block legislative actions by parliament, they also continued exacting a special fee before a new tenant could move onto a rented holding. In addition to rental payments (i.e., about 40 percent of the produce of the land), in order to maintain their tenancy and with the favour of the landlord tenants had to provide the landlord with firewood, maintain the landlord's fence and present a gift on religious holidays and other social occasions. Moreover, the entire tax burden, wrote Markakis:

> fell entirely on the shoulders of the peasant cultivator, where it has been since time immemorial, while the landholders not only escaped taxation but also continued to appropriate part of the taxes they collected for the state (1974: 121-22; see also Abdul Mejod, 1976:14).

Though land in the northwestern part of Ethiopia was supposed to be communally owned, with the vist system of landholding in principle to ensure that "everyone holds land by virtue of membership in the kinship groups" (Markakis, 1974: 80), eviction of peasants was common. For instance, in 1972, it was estimated that because of leasing, litigation and confiscation by the state for failing to pay tribute, more than 20 percent of the households were landless (see Blaug, 1973: 126 and Markakis, 1974: 82). In addition, there is ample evidence to show that since 1958 many peasants migrated to the other parts of Ethiopia to become beggars or, if lucky enough, to take up jobs as porters in the urban areas and as seasonal labourers at the commerical farms because of the following predominant factors: (1) heavy taxation (i.e., agricultural income tax, tax for development projects, health and education); (2) surcharge for the maintenance of

churches. For instance, Lundstrom notes that in Wodjirate (Tigrae Province) with a population of about 25,000 each peasant on the average paid some Eth $20 a year for the construction and maintenance of the 39 churches (1976: 40); (3) soil erosion and fragmentation of holdings in order to accommodate new members who have established a family. A report by the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration in 1970 reveals that about 50 percent of the holdings in Tigrai and Begemder were smaller than half a hectare. About 68 percent of the holdings in Tigrai (on the average about seven persons per hectare) and 69 percent in Begemder were smaller than one hectare (Ministry of Land Reform and Administration as quoted in Markakis, 1974: 81). Last but not least, the famines which occurred in 1958, 1965 and 1971 - 74 are believed to have driven hundreds of thousands of peasants off their land. In 1971-74 alone, it is estimated that over 500,000 people died in Wollo and Tigrai provinces. Brian Aris, a noted journalist, has this to say about the famine in Wollo:

> I have visited refugee camps in the Middle East, photographed starving babies in India and children injured by war in Vietnam, but I have never seen anything so horrifying and distressing as the situation in the Wollo province of Ethiopia (Aris as quoted in Addis, 1975:103).

Like the peasants, the workers were equally repressed and exploited in the hands of the local and foreign investors. Following Haile Selassie's Investment Decree of 1963 (according to 1963 decree investors with capital over Eth $200,000 were exempted from income tax, tax on fuel and most important capital goods), most of the production in agriculture and industry became capital-intensive and labor-displacing. The technology employed in many industrial processes became capital-intensive because the means of production were geared to the needs of the industrial countries where the inputs were imported.

As indicated in Table 11, employment was virtually stagnant in the

ten industrial sectors in the face of continued population growth and rural-urban migration. In 1968/69 and 1970/71 there was a decrease of workers by 0.9%, 0.1%, 0.3%, 0.6% and 0.3% in the Beverage, Tobacco, Textile, Non-Metallic mines, and Printing Press industries respectively. Moreover, there was no appreciable increase of workers in the Food, Wood, Chemical, Steel and Electrical industries

TABLE 11

Employment by Industrial Branches

| Industrial Branch | 1962/69 | 1970/71 |
|---|---|---|
| Food manufacturing | 15.3 | 16.7 |
| Beverages | 6.7 | 5.8 |
| Tobacco | 1.2 | 1.1 |
| Textile | 45.8 | 43.5 |
| Leather & Shoes | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| Wood | 6.6 | 7.8 |
| Non-Metallic Mines | 8.1 | 8.5 |
| Printing | 3.3 | 3.0 |
| Chemical | 5.4 | 6.1 |
| Steel, Metal & Electrical | 3.4 | 4.3 |

Source : Compiled from Statistical Abstract, 1972, p. 51

According to Blaug's estimation, in Addis Ababa where most of the major industries are concentrated between 1964-69 "manufacturing only increased by 2 percent while output increased 100 percent" and urban population grew at 7 percent per annum, consisting of 2.4 percent natural growth and 4.6 percent immigration (1974: 73-82).

Two cases in point where the use of capital-intensive technology by employers has reduced the ability of industries to offer adequate numbers of jobs are well demonstrated by HVA, a sugar industry and Tendaho, a cotton plantation.

Despite a substantial increase in the production of sugar by HVA, evidence seems to show that there was no appreciable increase in the number of employees; and the native wages have remained constant for more than a decade. Bondestam describes the situation at HVA as follows:

> The capital-intensive investments have only benefitted the industrialists in Europe (who exported the machinery and technology) and have contributed to the outflow of capital at the expense of increased employment opportunities in Ethiopia.
>
> Thus, huge reserves of manpower remain unutilized, and this has made the minimization of wages possible - so long as the supply of manpower exceeds the demand; the wages are decided on the basis of what is needed to keep the labourers alive, and not on their contribution to production. Although a doubling of the wages of low-paid labourers could mean a reduction of profits by not more than 20 percent, wages are kept down in the minimum level, which is Eth $1-2 per day. In 1971, 90 percent of the wage-earners received 33 percent... while the 2 percent who are highly paid earned 37 percent. A small group, mostly foreigners, live a comfortable isolated life in big villas with access to all possible entertainments. Their contact with the common workers are via educated or semi-educated group of Ethiopians, usually foremen, technicians, mechanics, and clerks, of whom most (but not all) have little or no interest in the socio-economic conditions of the exploited masses. Rather they compare their own situation to the ruling upper class (1974:434).

Moreover, Bondestam states that in 1967 and 1971 workers' strikes were aborted by the company because of the abundance of "reserve army," the absence of a workers' union, and the presence of troops which used force to dispense the strikers (1974).

Similarly, in the Cotton Plantation at Tendaho, mostly owned and managed by Mitchell Cotts, a British firm, the production of cotton had increased

substantially because of the company's use of capital-intensive technology and cheap seasonal labor. In 1973 alone, the net profits of the company constituted about "67 percent of the value of production." The daily wage of the native cotton-pickers was Eth $1, whereas the "unproductive labor," the technical supervisory staff, who were mostly foreigners were getting about Eth $80 a day (Bondestam, 1974: 436). The abysmally low wages and the working environment were insufficient to reproduce the labor; hence some of the cotton pickers had to go back to the highlands (that is to the pre-capitalist subsistence economy) after they collected enough cash to pay their taxes.

To conclude this section of the paper, the most notable socio-economic changes witnessed in Ethiopia during the 1942-74 period are:

1. The insertion of the Ethiopian economy into the ensemble of international financial institutions through economic assistance, loans, investments and international trade.

2. A stagnation in the economy as manifested in a chronic budget deficit and heavy indebtedness to foreign creditors.

3. The emergence of capital-intensive and labor-displacing large-scale commercial farms and manufacturing industries, mainly dominated by foreigners.

4. The deterioration of the living standard of the rural and urban proletarist.

Against this background let us now consider how some of the most significant educational reforms initiated during the 1942-74 period corresponded/contradicted the above mentioned socio-economic changes.

## SECTION III

## EDUCATIONAL REFORMS SINCE 1942

The education profile of Ethiopia for the last three decades reveals many of the same features as the economy. From 1942-52, it was dominated by the British. With the decline of British influence in the Ethiopian politico-economic sphere in 1953, however, the educational reforms implemented in the country were by and large U.S. imports. In the following section, the major educational reforms initiated by the British will be reviewed. This will be followed by a brief discussion of some of the salient educational reforms implemented by the American experts. Then an assessment of how the externally generated educational reforms failed to provide equal educational opportunity for Ethiopian school age children is presented. Finally, how some of the contradictions stemming from the educational system resulted in the politicization of high school and university students and ultimately contributed to the downfall of the ancien regime is discussed.

A year after Ethiopia got its constitutional independence from the fascist colonists, the Ethiopian Government started to rebuild the education system. The Ministry of Education was reestablished and some schools were opened, (namely the Menelik II and the Tafari Makonnen school for boys and the Itegue Menen school for girls). As in the other ministries, however, the British maintained a great influence in the organization of the education system and closely supervised the day to day activities of the schools. A British representative at the Ministry of Education, Mr. E. R. J. Hussey, ensured that the curricula, textbooks, some of the teachers and the school principals were imported either from England or Canada or from the British colonies and protectorates, namely, India, Sudan, the Middle East, etc. For instance, the Inspector General, the coordinator of the curricula, and the head of Buildings and Grounds were all British. Many of the elementary school posts and almost all

the Secondary School posts were held by British or Indians (Perham, 1947:

The $200,000 worth of books donated by the British Consul in 1944 was used in most of the schools (Andargatchew, 1973: 44). Since the primary objective of education was to make the students proficient in the English language, English was adopted as the medium of instruction. To accomplish this objective, all academic subjects were taught in the English language, starting from grade four; and textbooks primarily designed for the schools in the colonies were imported from England.

Little effort was made to adopt the school curriculum to the needs of the learners. For example, in the arithmetic lessons given at the elementary schools, a British series of "High Arithmetic" was used which involved problem solving in pound sterling, shillings, and metric units and which had little or no relevance to the day to day activities of the students. Similarly, the flora and fauna of the British Isles the history of the Western Civilization, the story of the "Knights of the Roundtable" formed the core of social sciences and literature. The science courses were highly theoretical. Lessons in health, personal hygiene, sanitation, and agriculture which could have been relevant to the needs of the students and the community at large were completely neglected.

Since the content of what was taught was foreign to students, and English was by and large their third language, the students had no choice but to memorize the textbook by heart in order to pass their examinations. In his discussion about the teaching and learning process of that period, Lipsky has this observation:

> Teaching in the primary and middle school is still largely by rote. The student is rewarded for knowing extensive, recondite texts by heart and for memorizing impressive arrays of facts. Skill in reading and recitation is rewarded but reading comprehension is practically ignored (1962: 97).

As one would expect, learning based on rote memorization and accumulation of unrelated facts did not enable the students to be "proficient" in English. Students, particularly those from the provincial schools, had very poor results in the national examination given at the end of the elementary school year. Consequently, they could not gain admission to the secondary schools in the capital city. To counteract this deficiency, elementary schools in the province were extended by two more years to include grades seven and eight. As stated by Miaza, the training however,

> .... was little more than a re-hash of the requirements for grades V and VI, with a few new textbooks added, notably two volumes of "school science: and "The Old World Past and Present," a volume of more than six hundred pages for the teaching of geography and history (1966:84).

In the secondary schools, the curriculum was based on the London Matriculation Examination. As for the headmaster and teachers they were mostly supplied by the British Council, the main objectives of the curriculum were to make the students proficient in the English language. For example, in the two elite schools in Addis Ababa, the Haile Selassie I Secondary School (opened in 1943 for the sons of the ruling class who completed their primary education in Kenya, the Sudan, and in the Middle East where their parents had been in exile during the Italian occupation), and the General Wingate secondary school (established in 1946 in memory of Orde-Wingate, a British general who served as a commander-in-chief of the Ethiopian Liberation Army in 1941), the students were prepared for the London Matriculation Examination and the General Certificate of Education. Students who passed their examination were sent for further teaching to England or Canada. Indeed, some of the future leaders of the country and particularly those who were at the Haile Selassie Secondary School became proficient in English. Perham quotes the headmaster

of a school as saying that "the boys had worked with tremendous zeal enthusiasm and had shown progress even in subjects which were quite new to them. Some of them had written essays in English which were on a level with those written by English boys in corresponding forms" (1947:251).

The University College of Addis Ababa, established in 1950 as a two-year liberal arts college by a group of Canadian Jesuits was originally a branch of the University of London. To ensure that the college had met the necessary standards an approach was made to the British inter-University Council to evaluate the program and the educational qualification of the faculty members, in line with the program offered at the University of London, since it was a liberal arts college, to use Maxrui's words, "designed and reserved for the study of high culture, for the pursuit of high scholarship." Technical courses which would have been necessary for the training of skilled manpower were completely neglected. (For a detailed discussion on how technical courses were neglected in African Universities, see Mazrui, 1975).

After the implementation of President Truman's Point Four Program of Technical Assistance to Ethiopia in 1953, the British predominance in the Ethiopian educational system dwindled. Like the economy, the education system was inserted into the American system. The British experts in the Ministry of Education were replaced by members of the Ethiopian United States Cooperative Education Program. Experts from Oklahoma State University came as advisers under contract with the United States Operations Mission in Ethiopia. Upon the recommendation of Dr. William Winkle, Director, Ethiopian United States Cooperative Education Program "...a consultant of the Public Administration Service of Chicago, Illinois, was invited in 1953 to study the Ministry's organization and make suggestions for appropriate change" (Miaza, 1966:100). Based on the consultant's recommendation, the Ministry of Education was reorganized to reflect the educational program in the United States. For instance,

departments such as Teacher Education, Tests & Measurements, Arts and Crafts, Audio-Visual, Research and Higher Education, etc. were created.

The purchase of school supplies, textbooks and audio-visual materials also shipped from Britain to markets in the United States. From 1952 to 1958 alone, more than 3500 professional textbooks for teachers, over 495,000 copies of textbooks and 292,550 copies of periodicals for students were either imported from the United States or produced by the Point Four establishment in Ethiopia (Ethiopia Observer, 1958:7). Upon the advice of the American experts, a system of eight years of elementary and four years of secondary education was established throughout the empire. As stated by Andargakhew, the main argument in favour of the 8-4 structure was that "..students would be better prepared, in terms of their knowledge of English, both for secondary and higher institutions of learning where English would remain as the medium of instruction." Another argument put forward by the experts was that "many students dropped out of school after the elementary cycle. If they were to remain in school for two more years, they would not only acquire additional education but would also be more mature and suitable for employment" (1973:62).

Interestingly enough, the curriculum in the elementary schools became examination oriented. In schools the essay type of test (or as they are called in the Ethiopian schools, the "British method of testing") was replaced by the objective type of test, specifically with multiple choice items. Students who sat for the Grade Eight National Examination were required to take the objective tests. However, the transition from essay tests to objective tests was not smooth. Many students who did well on teacher made tests did not get admitted to the secondary schools in Addis Ababa. "Several case studies showed that great disparity existed between achievement in school and achievement on the tests" (Miaza, 1966:96). The Indian teachers in the elementary schools had problems of adjusting to the new method of testing because they

were used to the British system. Last but not least, instead of adjusting the curriculum to reflect local needs, the teachers in the upper grades started coaching "their pupils for the (national) examination, sometimes starting in the seventh grade, on the basis of the 'expected outcomes' outlined by the Bureau of Tests and Measurements" (Miaza, 1966: 96).

In addition to the afore-mentioned changes, the University College of Addis Ababa was re-oriented to look like one of the liberal arts colleges in the United States. It had two faculties - one in Arts and the other in Science. The College of Agriculture was established in 1953 as a branch of Oklahoma State University (see Trudeau, 1968). In collaboration with a handful of Ethiopian educators, the American experts prepared a ten-year development plan (1955-1965) which was subsequently incorporated into the Country's First Five Development Plan. The major objectives of the plan included (1) the inauguration of a new type of community school, grades 1-4, for basic education, (2) the completion of the then existing primary schools with less than four grades, (3) the limitations of class size at the primary level to a maximum of 40 students, (4) the admission of selected students into the middle school (grades 5 to 8) and a further selection at the end of grade eight, (5) the establishment of at least one middle school in each (district) and (6) the preparation within the ten year period of more than 2,000 and 850 teachers for the community schools and 850 for the middle schools (Ministry of Education, 1955: XVII-XXII).

To staff the envisaged community schools, two Community Education Teacher Training Centers were opened, one in 1957 at Majeti, under the sponsorship of UNESCO, and another in 1958 at Debre Berhane, sponsored by the Point Four Mission. However, in 1960 the two programs were abandoned. The center at Majeti was turned over to the Ministry of Community Development. The center

at Majeti was turned over to the Ministry of Community Development. The center at Debre Berhane was converted into a two year program mainly drawing its trainees from grade ten. In his explanation of why the two programs were abandoned, Andargatchew makes the following observations:

> The students selected from the community schools were not particularly fit for the job as most of them were unwilling to do manual work. Even their standards were too low to grasp the idea of community education and pass it on to the people of the community. Some teachers were too young to be able to carry the confidence of the people of the community. The other problem was that people wanted regular academic education for their children that would enable them to move to higher education rather than practical training that could keep them on the farm (1973: 54-55).

Andargatchew's assessment of the graduates from the two centers is nothing but an impression without substance. Contrary to his argument, there is enough evidence to show that the graduates were mature and dedicated to their work. Of those who joined the Debre Berhane Community Education Teacher Training Center in 1958, thirty-five out of 83 were married and were recruited from among practicing teachers and mature students who successfully passed the Eighth Grade National Examination. Upon graduation the teachers were not only willing to work in rural areas but also in co-operation with their communities, to build schools and design teaching aids from the materials available within their immediate environment (see Miaza, 1966 and Ethiopia Observer, 1958). Of course, since the Center at Majeti was specifically designed for the preparation of "village level workers," the trainees were recruited from among mature teachers in the rural areas upon the recommendation of their immediate supervisors. Instead, it would appear that the existing programs were abandoned because there was a change of policy in the United States and accordingly a change of advisers in Ethiopia who promoted different educational programs.

With a change of leadership in the United States Government in 1960, the Point Four Program was transformed and renamed Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). The major A.I.D. program objectives for Ethiopia were

> ...to assist Ethiopia to mobilize its own resources and expand the monetary economy by (a) increasing commercial agricultural and industrial production; and (b) developing manpower training and education; and (c) improving organizational and administration skills. By helping Ethiopian economic effort, A.I.D. seeks to promote economic and political development, and thereby safeguard important U.S. strategic interest (Emphasis mine; A.I.D. as quoted in Getachew, 1971: 157).

We have shown above how United States' military, agriculture and economic interests were fulfilled after the A.I.D. and other U.S. connected programs were launched in Ethiopia. In the education sector, most of the U.S. staff who came under the Point Four Program were replaced by A.I.D. staff. As one would expect, the new A.I.D. advisers had different approaches as to how the Ethiopian educational system should be organized. Based on their advice, the education structure at the school level was re-organized to include six years of elementary and six years of comprehensive secondary education (that is, two years of junior and four years of senior secondary program).

In the elementary schools multiple classes were introduced in which students were grouped according to ability and with a self-contained pattern of organization "with one teacher teaching all subjects" (see Handbook for Elementary Schools, 1964:6). In order to implement the new programs, one-year and summer in-service training programs for elementary school directors and supervisors were established at the Haile Selassie I University, Faculty of Education, beginning in the 1962-63 academic year. As stated by Miaza:

> Under the joint sponsorship of the Ministry of Education and the University, the course was offered to men with two or more years' experience so that they would become better educational leaders and agents of change, particularly in the provincial primary schools. Each year, for a planned period of five years, one hundred directors and twenty-five supervisors were to be recruited into this program (1966: 198-199).

Upon the advice of the USAID staff experts and with financial assistance procured from the World Bank and the United States, comprehensive secondary schools were imported to Ethiopia in the beginning of 1961, in order to man the expanding administrative machinery, to export capital labor goods to staff country in the form of teaching equipment and construction materials, and of course to supply the cheap semi-skilled labor needed in the foreign owned enterprises, since it is cheaper for the foreign investors to have workers trained for them at public expense. For example, like the junior high school program in the United States the junior secondary schools in Ethiopia were designed to differentiate students into separate streams according to abilities and vocational goals. With proper guidance, it was hoped that the two years would serve as a stage for channeling the students into the various streams in the senior comprehensive secondary schools and subsequently into the University or other junior colleges and the labor market. In addition, the curriculum stressed intensive English language training. The purpose of the junior secondary program was

> ...to provide an intensive course in English language skills, and to give each student a general introduction to at least three practical fields. The first purpose becomes even more necessary now that the language of instruction in elementary school grades (one to six) is Amharic. But it is the second purpose on which the effective implementation of the secondary school courses depends for the exploratory introduction to the practical fields which will enable the student to determine his special interests and abilities. With this in mind, it will be possible to place the student in an appropriate course of studies on completion of grade eight (1969:1).

In the senior secondary schools, a dual system of education-vocational alongside academic streams was opened within the same compound. After brief experimentation with the Worzero Sihen School in Dessie and the Tafari Makonnen School in Addis Ababa, many of the existing academic secondary schools (with the exception of the prestigous schools such as the Wingate,

Nazerth School, etc. which were exclusively reserved for the children of the wealthy Ethiopians and foreigners) were converted into comprehensive secondary schools. In 1972 alone about forty of the sixty-one secondary schools in the country had some form of comprehensive secondary school program (see Desta, 1977). Starting in 1962 "USAID assisted in the equipping of the vocational and technical stream of sixteen comprehensive secondary schools, and the IDA agreed to provide Eth $18,000,000 in a loan for the expansion of facilities" (Abebe and Mohammed, 1970:95). To teach in these comprehensive secondary schools, 177, 326, and 490, and 350 American Peace Corps volunteers were recruited in 1962, 1963-64 and 1965 and 1966 respectively. (See Tiekaher, 1975:132). Starting in 1968, however, the number of Peace Corps Volunteers teaching in the comprehensive secondary schools has been declining because of the prevalence of anti-American feeling among the students.

It is worth pinpointing at this juncture that although the comprehensive secondary schools program has been in operation for more than a decade, to date the curriculum objectives are nebulous and are stated only in a generalized way. The objectives include statements such as "to produce people who can think objectively and dispassionately," and "to prepare students to participate efficiently in the productive work," without specifying the context or subject area that could produce the expected behavior. What is more, the stated objectives are too general for classroom teachers to translate into actual teaching practices and effective evaluation methods (see Desta, 1971: 66-67). In the selection of the curriculum content, communities are never utilized as part of the learning process. Schools are never kept informed about employment conditions and changes in the economic scene. They are required only to teach what is prescribed by the experts in the Ministry of Education. What is more, there is little evidence to demonstrate that the comprehensive secondary schools, particularly those in the provinces, have so far contributed to the economic development of their immediate communities.

Contrary to what was envisaged, the graduates from the comprehensive secondary schools did not get productive employment opportunities in their area of specialization. Quite the contrary, as will be demonstrated later, unemployment among high school graduates was quite rampant starting in 1968. Furthermore, we will argue that since the construction of the comprehensive secondary schools was expensive and was mainly used as a means of exporting capital goods to Ethiopia (under the pretext that the construction of class rooms had to meet international specifications at a cost a number of times higher than that of classrooms built to some suitable local standard), they again left the country dependent on foreign assistance and loans. For instance, foreign sources provided 28 percent of the financial impact to education in Ethiopia, compared with 10 percent in the case of Kenya and three percent in the case of Tanzania (ter Weele, 1973, see also Table 11). Moreover only a few of the sons and daughters of the wealthy (that is, those active in the economy where big foreign finance capital has wielded great influence, the autocracy, the gentry and other functionaries in the administrative machinery) attended the vocational streams. Instead, the rich parents sent their children abroad to Europe and America, or registered their children in the above mentioned foreign-operated elitist secondary schools, which as expected were well equipped, staffed with highly qualified faculty members, and focused on academic subjects which prepare for the University. Those in academic streams got special encouragement from their teachers and were given special help sessions. On the other hand, those in the vocational streams did not get adequate attention from their teachers. In fact, in most cases they were discouraged from taking the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination (ESLEE). However, since students paid to sit for the ESLEE, they were not prevented from taking the examination. But since they were bound

TABLE 12

Major Educational Projects Financed by USAID (in Eth$000)

| Year | Project | Grant | Loan |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965-1972 | University Business College | 1,787.5 | --- |
| 1962-1972 | Comprehensive Secondary Schools | 4,360.0 | --- |
| 1960-1972 | University Education Faculty | 11,567.5 | --- |
| 1961-1972 | Ministry of Education, Administration | 5,165.0 | --- |
| 1960-1972 | University Financial Support | 10,335.0 | --- |
| 1961-1972 | Education Advisory Service | 1,742.5 | --- |
| 1968-1972 | University Faculties | ——— | 750.0 |
| 1967-1972 | Program Assistance | ——— | 5,562.5 |
| | Total | 34,957.5 | 6,312.5 |

Source: S. G. Levine as quoted in Getachew, 1971:173

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to fail, most of them did fail. The few who somehow managed to pass three or more subjects were relegated to lower status diploma-oriented training institutions in order to block their ambition for higher degrees. In short, streaming served the interest of the well-to-do parents and has consequently contributed to educational and socio-economic inequalities. Students in vocational streams, by virtue of being assigned to these tracks on the basis of their performance in the Grade Eight National Examination, are substantially disadvantaged in their future educational careers and in the acquisition of social benefits which go with the credentials. (For a critical discussion of comprehensive high school programs, see a report on the Seminar of Junior and Senior secondary school Directors 1971) Hence, we argue that the dual system of schooling in Ethiopian secondary schools not only reflected the hierarchical social structure, but acted to sharpen and perpetuate class

differences.

USAID influence was not only limited to the first and second level of the Ethiopian education but also extended to the University. Like the comprehensive secondary school, the University was reorganized to serve U.S. interests or to use Mazrui's words, "produce appropriate manpower and redefining the market through acculturation" (1975:198).

Upon the recommendations of a University of Utah team headed by Dr. Bentley, the various colleges in the country were integrated into one centrally located financial and administrative unit. Administrators and financial experts from U. S. universities were assigned to the administrative hierarchy of the University (see Getachew, 1971: 182-183; Markakis, 1974:152, and United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970:1905). For instance, until recently the Vice President of Haile Selassie I University. the Dean of the Business College, the Dean of the Law School, the Associate Dean of the Faculty of Education and most of the faculty members were Americans. Teaching materials and other equipment were bought from United States markets or from American firms, located in other countries. Potential graduates who were expected to promote U.S. interest in Ethiopia were carefully screened and sent to the United States for further training under the USAID scholarship program. To meet U.S. academic standards, the curricula was modelled on college programs in the United States (an exception to this was that a few courses on Ethiopian Studies were offered). As accurately described by Markakis, "the organizational structure of the University, its curriculum design, the materials and methods of instruction are copies of the American undergraduate model" (1974: 188). Academic ranks similar to those in U.S. universities were introduced. Appointment of faculty members was based on formal degrees. For instance, even though the Department of Ethiopian Languages offered courses in Amharic, Geez, and Arabic, nationals who had an intimate

knowledge of these languages and other vernaculars were barred from teaching in the University because they did not have the necessary credentials.

To summarize, from 1942-1974 the Ethiopian educational system has passed through various profound changes. Like the economy, in the 40's and the first quarter of the 50,'s the major educational reforms introduced into the country were British-oriented, For the last two decades, the curricula and and teaching materials were basically U.S. imports. Depending on the economic interest of their country and their educational exposure, the American advisers imposed enumerable educational packages upon the Ethiopean scene. Yet despite the educational reforms introduced into the country and a token proclamation by the Ethiopian Government in 1955 that "all boys and girls between the ages of seven and eighteen" are entitled to receive equal educational opportunity, (The Voice of Ethiopia as quoted in Miaza, 1966:114), one cannot help but notice that in 1974 the Ethiopian educational system was characterized by: (1) low participation rate of primary and secondary school age children, (2) disparity in educational opportunity between the different regions, between the sexes and between rural and urban areas, (3) a high drop out rate in both elementary and secondary schools, (4) a high pupil-teacher ratio and inadequate operational budget, and (5) a high rate of unemployment among high school graduates due to the stagnation of the economy, thereby contributing to student politicization and open confrontation with the corrupt and decaying system of the old. We will now consider these points in detail.

Inequality In The Participation Rate of School Age Children

Over the period from 1963 to 1973/74, school enrolment in Ethiopian primary and secondary schools had expanded slowly. When compared with the 1963/64 enrolment figure, by 1973/74 enrolment at the primary level had almost doubled; it had quadrupled at the junior

secondary level and increased about six times at the senior secondary level. In both primary and secondary schools, student enrolment had been increasing at the annual rates of 15%, 15.4%, 12.2% 9.6% and 7.7% in 1968/69, 1969/70, 1970/71, 1971/72, 1972/73 respectively. However, the provincial distribution of primary school enrolment in 1972 reveals important deviations from equality (see Table 13).

Most notably, Addis Ababa, with 132,800 school children represented 70 percent of the enrolment. Nine provinces -(Bale, Begemdir Gemu Gofa, Gojjam, Hararge, Kefa, Sidamo, Tigrai, and Wallo) were below the national average, (i.e., 16 percent). The educational provinces which had a participation rate equal to or higher than the national average were Arusi, Eritrea, Illubabor, Shoa, Wellega and Addis Ababa.

At the Awraja (district) level there were great discrepancies in educational opportunity. Of the total of one hundred two districts, sixty-four had average participation rates below the national average. In some districts there were few traces of school facilities of any type, but others had enrolment rates as high as 28 percent of school-age children (Ministry of Education, 1972: 134).

At the Wereda (subdistrict) level, 44 out of 518 subdistricts were without government schools; 36 of these 44 subdistricts were located in the provinces of Hararge, Tigrai, and Sidamo. Moreover, some of the government primary schools were incomplete; that is, they did not have all grades from one to six. This meant that even those who were fortunate enough to obtain a place in the system were not able to complete their primary education (see Ministry of Education, 1972).

In 1970/71, thirty-five percent of primary schools in the country (that is, 417 out of 1,190)were incomplete. These incomplete schools were located mainly in the rural areas (Ministry of Education, 1972).

TABLE 13

Provincial Distribution of School Enrolment

| Province | Number of School Age Children | Enrolment | Participation Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Arusi | 134,600 | 30,746 | 22.8 |
| 2. Bale | 164,000 | 12,046 | 7.3 |
| 3. Begemdir | 213,400 | 29,584 | 13.8 |
| 4. Eritrea | 303,400 | 88,292 | 29.1 |
| 5. Gemu Gofa | 110,400 | 12,734 | 11.5 |
| 6. Gojjam | 375,200 | 29,225 | 10.6 |
| 7. Hararge | 529,100 | 39,445 | 7.4 |
| 8. Illubabor | 109,400 | 20,743 | 18.9 |
| 9. Kefa | 203,000 | 20,607 | 10.1 |
| 10. Shoa | 702,200 | 109,393 | 15.5 |
| 11. Sidamo | 391,000 | 40,778 | 10.4 |
| 12. Tigrai | 288,300 | 30,077 | 10.4 |
| 13. Wellega | 200,400 | 66,979 | 33.4 |
| 14. Wello | 388,800 | 31,326 | 8.0 |
| 15. Addis Ababa | 132,800 | 92,849 | 69.9 |
| Total | 4,146,000 | 654,824 | 15.7 |

Source:

Compiled from Ministry of Education: Report to the Education Sector Review, 1972

Data on provincial distribution of secondary education indicates that even though Addis Ababa, Eritrea, Shoa, and Hararge comprised only 40 percent of the school age children, 62 percent of the student population in junior and senior secondary schools were found in those provinces. The provinces of Bale, Gamu Gofa, and Illubabor had the smallest enrolments.

In 1972, of the sixty-one secondary schools, thirteen were in Addis Ababa. Ten were in the provinces of Shoa, seven were in Eritrea and five in Hararge province. Five were in Tigrai province.

The distribution of non-government secondary schools more or less followed the same pattern. Twenty-two were located in Addis Ababa, ten in Eritrea, seven in Shoa, and six in Wellega (see School Census, 1972-73: 91).

Disparity Between Rural-Urban Enrolment

In Ethiopia the educational system was urban biased. Almost all schools were concentrated in narrow belts adjacent to the main roads, mainly in urban areas, while rural areas were sparsely covered. As stated by Markakis, the school facilities in the urban areas were predominantly utilized by the sons and daughters of merchants and civil servants. These groups took advantage of the limited educational system because the schools were mainly located in urban areas; and unlike peasant households, their parents were able to support them financially while they were at school (1973: 378). However, it is worth stressing that there was an unequal distribution of primary schools among towns. For example, the participation rate of school age children in Addis Ababa was 53 percent, whereas in some provincial towns it was less than 10 percent.

A study conducted by the Ministry of Education in seventy-two towns indicated that in the provincial towns school enrolment ranged from as high as 47 percent in Tigrai to as low as 10 percent in Illubabor (see Ministry of

Education, 1972: 135). This is a clear indication that even among the provincial towns there was a high concentration of primary schools in some towns while other towns had very few primary schools.

Low Participation of Females

In the Ethiopian educational system girls were under-represented. In 1960/61, about 23 percent of the students in all schools were girls. However in 1970/71, girls constituted about 30 percent of the student enrolment in primary schools. The average enrolment of girls in secondary schools was 23 percent of the total. However, there was under-representation of girls in the provinces. For example, in 1970/71 in Addis Ababa girls represented 35 percent. of those enrolled. In Eritrea the rate was 14 percent, and in Shoa about 11 percent. Bale, Illubabor and Gemu Gofa had enrolments of less than 1 percent (see Ministry of Education, 1972: 135).

Attrition Rate

The Ethiopian educational system suffered from a severe rate of attrition. About half of the students who entered the first grade of primary school dropped out before reaching grade five. When we compare the dropout rate in Ethiopia with that in Kenya, Tanzania, and the Sudan (using the 1968 age cohort), Ethiopia had the highest dropout rate of the four countries. The The dropout rate in 1972 was 51 percent, followed by Tanzania with 38 percent, Kenya with 23 percent, and the Sudan with 22 percent (see UNESCO, November, 1975).

The dropout rate in Ethiopian government schools shows that of the 103,753 students who were in public schools in grade one in 1967/68, seventy-one percent were in grade two in 1968/69, sixty-seven percent were in grade three, and 65 percent were in grade four, and 58 percent were in grade five in 1971/72 (see Table 14).

Table 14

Drop Out Rates and Tapoffs
in Government Primary Schools
1967/68 - 1971/72

| Year | Grade 1 | Grade 2 | Grade 3 | Grade 4 | Grade 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967/68 | M 73,868<br>F 29,884<br>T 103,753 | | | | |
| 1968/69 | | M 51,926<br>F 21,428<br>T 73,354<br>% 70.7 | | | |
| 1969/70 | | | M 48,774<br>F 20,447<br>T 69,221<br>% 66.7 | | |
| 1970/71 | | | | M 46,967<br>F 20,478<br>T 67,445<br>% 65.0 | |
| 1971/72 | | | | | M 42,095<br>F 18,403<br>T 60,498<br>% 58.3 |
| % Drop Outs | | 29.3 | 33.3 | 35.0 | 41.7 |

Source:

Compiled from School Census 1969/70 - 1972/73, p. 21.

As shown in Table 14 the incidence of dropouts was higher among boys than among girls. Of those 29,884 girls who entered grade one in 1967/68. sixty-two percent reached grade five in 1971/72, whereas only 57 percent of the boys reached grade five by the same year.

TABLE 15

Drop Out Rates and Tapoffs
in Government Senior Secondary Schools
1969/70 - 1972/73

| Year | Grade 9 | Grade 10 | Grade 11 | Grade 12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1969/70 | M 12,695<br>F 3,139<br>T 15,834 | | | |
| 1970/71 | | M 11,339<br>F 2,898<br>T 14,237<br>% 89.9 | | |
| 1971/72 | | | M 9,726<br>F 2,300<br>T 12,026<br>% 75.9 | |
| 1972/73 | | | | M 7,465<br>F 1,521<br>T 8,986<br>% 56.7 |
| % Drop Outs | | 10.1 | 21.1 | 43.3 |

Source:
Compiled from School Census 1969/70 - 1972/32, Part I.

The opposite picture is observed in secondary schools. As shown in Table 15 of those boys who were enrolled in grade nine in 1969/70, fifty-seven percent reached grade twelve in 1972/73. However, of those girls who were enrolled in grade nine in 1969/70, only 48 percent were in grade twelve in 1972/73.

From these two tables we can conclude that the rate of attrition in both primary and secondary schools was quite high, especially when we consider that only 16 percent of the school age children were in primary schools and 4.5 percent of the school age population were in secondary schools in 1972. Furthermore, it is possible to say that in pre-revolutionary Ethiopia, the elementary educational system had failed to give a minimum primary education as far as those who drop out were concerned.

Maldistribution of qualified teachers

Perhaps the most important component of educational quality received by students could be embedded in the educational qualification of the faculty members. In general the distribution of faculty members in Ethiopia mirrored the maldistribution of educational facilities in the country. In 1971/72, about 44% of the teachers in primary schools were located in Addis Ababa, Eritrea, Hararge and Shoa. The rest (about 55%) were in the other eleven educational provinces. About 47% of the junior secondary school teachers were found in Addis Ababa, Eritrea and Shoa. About 57% of the senior secondary school teachers were found in Addis Ababa, Eritrea and Shoa. Compounding this general maldistribution of teachers was the similar maldistribution of the highly qualified teachers (i.e., those with a university education. Addis Ababa had 31.3% of the highly qualified teachers with university education, followed by Shoa, 14.6% and Eritrea, 11.2% (see Table 16). Moreover, the highly qualified teachers were mostly foreigners, and the number of

Ethiopian faculty members increased on the average by less than one percent. a year from 1969/70 to 1972/73 (School Census, 1969/70 - 1972/73).

TABLE 16

Educational Qualifications of Foreign and Ethiopian Teachers in Government School 1971-72

| Province | School | 1st, 2nd Levels and Voc-Tech Education (%) | Teacher Training Graduates (%) | Higher Educ (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Addis Ababa | Primary | 14.2 | 9.9 | 14.7 | 11.1 |
| | Junior Sec. | 19.4 | 17.7 | 19.6 | 18.7 |
| | Senior Sec. | 30.5 | 18.4 | 31.3 | 30.4 |
| 2. Arusi | Primary | 2.9 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 4.4 |
| | Junior Sec. | 4.9 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| | Senior Sec. | 2.7 | 4.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| 3. Bale | Primary | 1.6 | 3.1 | 5.4 | 2.9 |
| | Junior Sec. | 2.0 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 1.6 |
| | Senior Sec. | - | - | 0.9 | 0.7 |
| 4. Begemdir | Primary | 5.0 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 6.3 |
| | Junior Sec. | 4.6 | 2.9 | 5.4 | 4.1 |
| | Senior Sec. | - | 10.9 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| 5. Eritrea | Primary | 16.4 | 7.5 | 13.8 | 9.8 |
| | Junior Sec. | 20.6 | 16.9 | 9.4 | 14.7 |
| | Senior Sec. | 26.4 | 20.1 | 11.2 | 13.6 |
| 6. Gemu Gofa | Primary | 1.9 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| | Junior Sec. | 0.8 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 2.2 |
| | Senior Sec. | 3.1 | - | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| 7. Gojjam | Primary | 5.0 | 7.1 | 8.7 | 6.7 |
| | Junior Sec. | 3.7 | 3.5 | 6.6 | 4.7 |
| | Senior Sec. | 4.5 | 1.6 | 6.0 | 4.4 |
| 8. Hararge | Primary | 6.2 | 8.0 | 4.6 | 7.4 |
| | Junior Sec. | 6.9 | 4.5 | 6.4 | 5.6 |
| | Senior Sec. | 5.0 | 0.8 | 7.5 | 6.7 |

TABLE 16
(Continued)

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9. Illubabar | Primary | 3.4 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 4.0 |
| | Junior Sec. | 5.8 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.6 |
| | Senior Sec. | - | 1.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| 10. Kefa | Primary | 2.0 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 4.1 |
| | Junior Sec. | 1.4 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| | Senior Sec. | 0.9 | 9.2 | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| 11. Shoa | Primary | 20.9 | 14.0 | 15.7 | 15.6 |
| | Junior Sec. | 6.6 | 14.6 | 17.9 | 14.5 |
| | Senior Sec. | 2.2 | 10.0 | 14.6 | 12.9 |
| 12. Sidamo | Primary | 4.8 | 6.5 | 2.5 | 5.9 |
| | Junior Sec. | 7.8 | 7.9 | 3.7 | 6.4 |
| | Senior Sec. | 6.8 | 6.7 | 4.3 | 4.7 |
| 13. Tigrai | Primary | 2.6 | 6.6 | 3.1 | 5.5 |
| | Junior Sec. | 4.6 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 4.9 |
| | Senior Sec. | 6.8 | 3.3 | 5.1 | 5.2 |
| 14. Wellega | Primary | 3.6 | 6.0 | 3.8 | 5.4 |
| | Junior Sec. | 1.7 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 4.4 |
| | Senior Sec. | 4.5 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.0 |
| 15. Wello | Primary | 8.5 | 6.4 | 3.3 | 6.7 |
| | Junior Sec. | 8.4 | 8.5 | 4.9 | 7.1 |
| | Senior Sec. | 5.9 | 9.2 | 4.7 | 5.1 |

Source Compiled From School Census, 1969/70 - 1972/73, Part I

Excessive number of students per teacher:

It is assumed by most educators that classrooms with fewer students are more conducive to learning and teaching. An analysis of pupil-teacher ratio in Ethiopia indicated that, except in private and mission schools which were predominantly reserved for the sons and daughters of the salaried civil servants and the rich merchants, almost all government schools were overcrowded. Even Addis and Eritrea, with the highest per-pupil expenditure, had a very high ratio, 1 teacher to 86 and 97 pupils, respectively. The national average in 1972 was 72-84; however, provinces with the lowest

participation rate such as Bale, Gemu Gofa and Gojjam had the lowest pupil-teacher ratio of 47,41 and 47, respectively.

Inadequate Education Budget

The education budget of a country is the educational program translated into fiscal terms. Hence the budget allocated to education can indicate how much priority is given to the schooling process in a country.

In Ethiopia, the financial expenditure on education between the years of 1957/58 and 1972/73 continued to fluctuate between 9.1 and 17.2 percent, and between 42.0 and 33.2 percent, on the average for national defense and security (in Table 17). However, the Ministry of Education never completely received the approved budget amounts. As stated by Mulugeta:

> On the average the Ministry of Education forfeits approximately Eth $2 million simply because it cannot get the money in time to spend it. As funds for recurrent expenditure are not transferable from year to year, the Ministry of Education loses all funds that were not transferred to the account of the central and provincial treasurers before the end of the fiscal year. Such a set-up encourages delays, and, in fact, it is said that provincial treasurers (Bejuronds) are sometimes evaluated on the basis of the amount of money "saved" for the Government through all sorts of delaying habits. (1967: 22).

Given these constraints, Ethiopia's per capita expenditure for education was the lowest in East Africa. At the primary level the per-pupil expenditure in 1972 was U.S. $25; at the secondary level it was U.S. $82 per student. When compared with Kenya and Tanzania, Ethiopia spent the least for education. In absolute terms, Ethiopia spent U.S. $56 million for education during the 1970/71 school year. Tanzania spent U.S. $81 million. Kenya spent U.S. $136 million. On a per capita basis, Ethiopia spent U.S. $2.20 per inhabitant. Tanzania and Kenya spent U.S. $6.00 and $11.80 per inhabitant, respectively. As a percentage of GDP, Ethiopia spent the least for education and Kenya the most of three countries. Ethiopia's expenditure for education

as a fraction of GDP comes to 3.4 percent, Tanzania spent 6.9 percent of her GDP, and Kenya's expenditure was about 8.9 percent of GDP (ter Weele, 1973). What is surprising is that even though a limited portion of the national budget was allocated to education, a large proportion of the recurrent educational budget was spent on salaries for educational personnel and students who drop out before completing elementary schools. For instance, as shown in Table 18, "From 1965/66 to 1965/69, while the total salary bill increased by 22% in primary education and by 170% in secondary education no recurrent wages other than for personnel grew only 10% in secondary education and actually decreased by 56% in primary education. The deterioration of cost patterns is reflected in the lowered quality of instruction, and in the almost complete lack of maintenance and upkeep of buildings and equipment" (IBRD and IDA, 1970:12); the budget was also unequally distributed among the provinces. Forty-one percent of the expenditure went to the two provinces of Shoa and Eritrea although the two provinces had only twenty-five percent of the total school age population in the country (Ministry of Education, 1972: 137).

Failures in the National Examination

As shown above, due to high drop out rates in primary and secondary schools, only a limited number of students sat for the National Examinations given at the end of grades six, eight and twelve.

Results of the Grade Six Examination indicated that of those who sat for the Grade Six Examination in 1972/73 only 54 percent (i.e., 48,595/90,710) passed. However, of that 54 percent, 39 percent were from Addis Ababa, 33 percent were from Shoa, and 22 percent were from Eritrea. Less than 5 percent of those who passed were from the provinces of Bale, Gemu Gofa, and Illubabor. Similarly, results of the Grade Eight National Examination show that of those who sat for this examination in 1972/73 only 51 percent (i.e., 25,923/50,179)

TABLE 17

Distribution of Recurrent Government Budget

1957/8 to 1972/3 (in millions of Eth $)

| Sector | 1957/8 Expenditure | % | 1963/64 Expenditure | % | 1968/69 Expenditure | % | 1972/73 Expenditure | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| National Defense and Internal Order | 66.4 | 42.0 | 109.2 | 46,3 | 161.9 | 35.6 | 186.8 | 33.2 |
| Agriculture | 1.6 | 1.0 | | 2.3 | 10.0 | 2.2 | 13.8 | 2.5 |
| Education & Culture | 14.5 | 9.1 | 29.9 | 12.7 | 54.9 | 12.1 | 97.3 | 17.2 |
| Health | | 2.9 | 15.9 | 6.7 | 18.9 | 4.2 | 29.9 | 5.3 |
| Other | 71.4 | 45.0 | 75.4 | 32.0 | 208.7 | 45.9 | 235.3 | 41.8 |
| Total | 158.5 | 100.0 | 235.8 | 100 | 454.4 | 100 | 563.1 | ;00 |

Source: Compiled from Taddese Woldneh, Ethiopia. The Political Economy of Planned Development in a Traditional Monarchy, 1978 and Economic Commission for Africa (1969-1975)

TABLE 18

Percentage of Recurrent Educational Expenditures

1965/66 to 1968/69

| | 1965/66 | 1966/67 | 1967/68 | 1968/69 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Education | % | % | % | % |
| Salaries | 90% | 93 | 94 | 98 |
| Other expenditures | 10 | 7 | 6 | 2 |
| Junior and Senior Secondary Education | | | | |
| Salaries | 86 | 85 | 87 | 91 |
| Other expenditures | 14 | 15 | 13 | 9 |
| Technical and Vocational Education | | | | |
| Salaries | 75 | 72 | 75 | 73 |
| Other expenditures* | 25 | 28 | 25 | 27 |
| Teacher Training | | | | |
| Salaries | 48 | 48 | 68 | 71 |
| Other expenditures* | 52 | 52 | 32 | 29 |

*Included boarding and stipends

Source: IBRD/IDA Economic Growth and Prospects, 1970:12

passed. Of these 26 percent were from Addis Ababa, 15 percent were from Shoa, and 13 percent were from Eritrea province. Bale, Gemu Gofa, and Illubabor constituted only 4 percent.

Results of the Grade Twelve National Examination show that in 1972/73 of those who sat for the National Examination only 22 percent (i.e. 1,614/7,179) successfully passed. However, of those who passed the National Examination, 53 percent were from Addis Ababa, 9 percent were from Shoa, and 7 percent were from Hararge. Bale, Gemu Gofa, Illubabor constituted less than 1.3 percent (see Table 19). Moreover, data for the previous years indicate that there was mass failure of students in the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination. For instance, in each of the academic years, 1965 to 1971, the percentage of student failure was 87, 87, 78, 73, 81, 82, and 81, respectively (see for example, School Census, 1965-73; Teshome, 1971).

Stated briefly, the preceding examples clearly demonstrate that the Ethiopian system, like the society at large, reflected inequality. As nicely put by one educator, the education system in Ethiopia had not only "opened the door to some sections of the population and closed its doors to others and had left many unaware that such doors existed," but also it reflected the country's dependence on foreign aid, and it reproduced the class structure. The few sons and daughters of the working class and the peasantry who managed to go to schools attended second rate public institutions. The few fortunate ones who managed to get admissions to these schools were systematically screened through a series of nationally administered examinations (see for example, Taddese, 1978 and Desta, 1977). Furthermore, as shown below, as the economic system stagnated, a large number of the school graduates could not be accommodated into the labor force.

Yet despite the systematic weeding out of students at the end of grades six, eight and twelve, due to the stagnation of the economy there was an

TABLE 19

National Examination Results 1972/73
Grades Six, Eight, and Twelve

| Province | Grade Six No. Passed | Grade Six % Passed | Grade Eight No. Passed | Grade Eight % Passed | Grade Twelve No. Passed | Grade Twelve % Passed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Addis Ababa | 10,392 | 21.3 | 6,633 | 25.6 | 855 | 52.9 |
| 2. Arussi | 1,832 | 3.4 | 899 | 3.5 | 55 | 3.4 |
| 3. Bale | 640 | 1.3 | 333 | 1.3 | 13 | .8 |
| 4. Begemdir | 2,102 | 4.3 | 1,324 | 5.1 | 71 | 4.4 |
| 5. Eritrea | 5,653 | 11.6 | 3,280 | 12.7 | 23 | 1.4 |
| 6. Gemu Gofa | 825 | 1.7 | 412 | 1.6 | 5 | .3 |
| 7. Gojjam | 2,294 | 4.7 | 1,137 | 4.4 | 40 | 2.5 |
| 8. Hararge | 2,915 | 6.0 | 1,554 | 6.0 | 118 | 7.3 |
| 9. Illubabor | 865 | 1.8 | 383 | 1.5 | 4 | .2 |
| 10. Kefa | 1,248 | 2.6 | 756 | 2.9 | 39 | 2.4 |
| 11. Shewa | 8,528 | 17.5 | 3,884 | 15.0 | 144 | 8.9 |
| 12. Sidamo | 3,514 | 7.2 | 1,461 | 5.6 | 58 | 3.6 |
| 13. Tigrai | 2,225 | 4.6 | 1,269 | 4.9 | 87 | 5.4 |
| 14. Wellega | 3,085 | 6.3 | 1,299 | 5.0 | 36 | 2.2 |
| 15. Wello | 2,477 | 5.1 | 1,309 | 5.0 | 66 | 4.1 |
| Total | 48,595 | 100 | 25,923 | 100 | 1,614 | 100 |

Source:

Compiled From School Census, 1969/70 - 1972/73, Part I.

oversupply of credentialled students. As the existing economic system became outmoded, a large number of the school leavers could not be accommodated as part of the labor force. Hence, as shown below, what we observe in Ethiopia in the 60s and the first half of the 70s in that the schooling system, in carrying out the demands placed on it by the economic base, reciprocally affected the economic structure, resulting in latent contradictions.

Unemployment among secondary school graduates

From 1942 to the early sixties, the students who graduated from Ethiopian high schools were automatically absorbed into the administrative machinery of the state. With such employment conditions graduates were offered elite status and high salaries, and enjoyed a relatively high standard of living. For instance, in the 1960's the starting salary for a high school graduate was Eth $200 per month. However, the estimated per capita income in the country was Eth $143 per annum. To some extent government offices used educational qualifications as a means of recruiting personnel. In fact, according to rules of the Ethiopian Government Personnel Agency, entry into the wage sector was almost entirely dependent on the amount of schooling completed. No advertisement of a government job opening was without stipulation as to the minimum schooling necessary for the applicant. Thus high school graduates had two choices, either to go to the university or to work for a while in order to earn wages.

Starting in the late sixties, though less than 4.5 percent of the school age population was in Ethiopian secondary schools, the number of secondary school graduates from both government and non-government secondary schools doubled from 4,751 in 1969/70 to 8,055 in1972/73. On the other hand, the rate of economic growth of GDP declined from 4.8 percent in 1963/68 to 3.6 percent in 1968/73. Agriculture, which is the mainstay of the economy, grew at the rate of 2.1 percent per annum over the past ten years.

Thus, due to the tight economic situation the country was facing for the years 1963-1973 and to the fact that the government which used to be the major employer of high school graduates seemed to have reached the saturation point, many high school leavers began to experience increasing difficulty in obtaining employment commensurate with the credentials they held. Moreover, the graduates were unable to find employment with the private sectors of the economy because the investors had become heavily dependent on capital-intensive and labor-displacing technology.

Starting in 1961 with assistance from USAID and IDA loans, many academic secondary schools were converted into comprehensive secondary schools with the sole aim of employing graduates from these schools locally. However, available evidence indicates that graduates from these schools have not been able to secure jobs within their immediate localities. For instance, when the first group of some 41 commercial and industrial arts students graduated from the Woizero Sihen Comprehensive Secondary School in Dessie in 1964, not one had found employment in Dessie. In another provincial school, out of the 106 commercial and 120 industrial arts students who graduated from 1965 to 1971, only seven were employed locally (see Gareau, 1971). This is a clear indication that the comprehensive school movement of the 1960's did not contribute to student employment as expected. Moreover, there is little evidence that these schools had created employment opportunities for the graduating students in the capital city. The examples presented below show that the secondary schools were producing more credentialled unemployed graduates in the labor market.

In 1968, out of 937 graduates from training institutions, about 354 were employed by either the government or private organizations and the remaining 583 were actively looking for jobs. In 1971, over 2,400 persons who had educational qualifications above elementary level were registered as

unemployed with the Addis Ababa Employment Office. These included more than 245 comprehensive secondary level graduates. On the other hand, fifty percent (i.e., 2,101) of all foreign work permit holders in the country had secondary level or less schooling (see Blaug, 1973).

Taking those who were registered with the Addis Ababa Employment Office, Blaug shows that in 1973 about 16 percent from vocational and academic streams of secondary schools were actively looking for jobs (1973: 65,66). Blaug's estimate does not cover the whole picture. First, it does not take into account those registered with the employment offices in Asmara and Dire Dawa. Second, it does not include high school graduates who were not registered with the employment offices.

As mentioned earlier, in 1972/73, out of 8,055 grade twelve students who sat for the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination, only 23 percent were qualified to enter the university. Given the fact that about 77 percent of the students had failed the E.S.L.C. Examination, we can roughly estimate that about 4,000 of the remaining 77 percent could get jobs or join the teacher training institutes, other training institutes (nursing, telecommunication, etc.) and non-degree institutions (i.e. junior colleges). Thus, around 25 percent of the high school leavers from previous years were unemployed and were actively seeking jobs in 1974, then we can say that in the Ethiopian economy the supply of manpower at the secondary level has outstripped demand, contributing to a high proportion of educated unemployed, resulting in a latent contradiction on the economic base. Due to lack of employment statistics by sector of economic activity and occupational skills, it is very difficult to assess the magnitude of unemployment among secondary school graduates in Ethiopia. Moreover, even though employment offices exist in Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Dire Dawa, either because secondary school leavers were not aware of the existence of such offices or because of communication problems,

many of the secondary school graduates actively seeking jobs did not register with the employment offices. However, the above cited evidence suggests that the incidence of actual unemployment among secondary school graduates was a real problem in Ethiopia. It was a real problem for school leavers who had failed the Twelfth Grade National Examination. After observing the unemployed high school graduates who went before them, students who were enrolled in school had come to doubt the widely held myth that schooling in Ethiopian society would lead to future employment and social mobility. As Levine has pointed out: "the rapid filling of jobs by the educated youth and steadily growing numbers of unemployed youth began to create anxieties about finding work in the future" (1965: 146).

The poor employment situation in the country, in conjunction with feeling of future lack of prospects among potential high school graduates, made the students feel cheated by the schools which had raised their aspirations and the society which had failed to fulfill their employment aspirations.

Under this socialization process for failure, the students had no choice but to reject the political and economic order and to feel that they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by shaking up the reproduction of the existing social relations of production. Indeed, they did shake up the system by exposing its inherent contradictions to the public, and thus in part contributed to the downfall of the ancien regime, as we shall now examine.

Student Activism as an Aspect of Manifest Contradiction

Except for occasional minor strikes concerning their conditions as students before the 60's student agitation against the political system was a rare phenomenon. For instance, "in 1956 the editorial in the first issue of the student paper of the University College invited students to write articles on any topic except politics and religion" (Markakis, 1974: 358).

This does not by any means, however, imply that students of that period had no dissatisfaction with the socio-economic and political order. In fact, there is ample evidence that many students were caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, they wanted to see the system reformed, but on the other hand, they wanted to get into it and share its privileges. However, there were no avenues for the students to express their opinions. They were forbidden from participating in school activities such as debates and literary contests (see Addis, 1975).

To the surprise of the regime, the year 1960 marked the birth of the Ethiopian student movement when university students, particularly, those at the University College of Addis Ababa, demonstrated in support of the coup d' état of December 1960. Even though the demands of the students mainly focused on a peaceful transition to a bourgeois oriented democratic government, modelled on the American pattern, nevertheless, the fact that the students were able to demonstrate and openly confront the regime set an unprecedented stage for their radicalization, which involved demonstrations on social-oriented issues and the publication of militant pamphlets.

It is worth noting here that after the loyalist army crushed the so called "rebels", the regime turned against those students who took part in the demonstration. In order to humiliate them, the students were dictated to "write letters of apology to the Emperor as a condition of being readmitted to study. They did so and returned to school" (Levine, 1965, 139). However, the attempt by the regime to cow the students into submission, did not prevent them from exposing the glaring contradiction in the system to the public. In their annual oratory and poem contest they continued attacking the socio-economic and political order. Indeed, they were able politicize and win public support against the regime. They also drew support from the

prospectless high school students who were looking for leadership. As stated by Hess, "as in Europe and America, dissenting University students in Ethiopia became the model for protest by secondary school students. Ironically, the government itself established the link between the two groups of students - - through the establishment University Service program" (1970:;169)

Starting in 1965, that is, a year after University Service students were assigned to teach in the provincial secondary schools as part of their degree or diploma requirements, student "demonstrations became annual events, and a pattern of confrontation was set, with university students taking the lead, followed by secondary school students in the capital and some of the larger towns" (Markakis, 1974: 359). Thus, starting in 1965, secondary school students in Ethiopia have either joined demonstrations led by university students or organized their own demonstrations and class boycotts.

In 1965 university and high school students in and around Addis Ababa demanded land reform. In 1966 they protested against governmental rounding up of jobless destitutes in concentration camps. As described by Addis:

> ...a group of militant students surreptituously entered these concentrations in Shola, and at great personal risk took photographs of the horrifying scenes of life in the concentration camps. Dead bodies unburied and littered all over the place, mothers emaciated in agonizing childbirth, and others unable to survive it, the living unfed and unclad. These pictures more than any other evidence clearly showed the exact nature of the ruling class, whose solution to unemployment and peasant eviction was the rounding up of the destitute in concentration camps. The forces of the student movement were then fully mobilized for a massive demonstration calling for the dismantling of the Shola camp, proper medical treatment for the victims, security of employment, and the trial of those who were directly responsible for such a policy (1975: 97).

In 1967 they demanded the affirmation of the right to public demonstration and assembly.

Between 1968 and 1969 secondary school students throughout the country voiced their grievances on a number of cases. In Debre Berhane, students went on strike after the director of Hailemariam Mamo secondary school

transferred two popular Ethiopian teachers. The confrontation between the security force and the students resulted in the killing of one student.

At Nazareth, students of Atse Gelawdos comprehensive secondary school demonstrated against the Twelfth Grade National Examination fee. "They stoned the provincial governor, the local military commander, and the town elders who tried to persuade them to pay the fee (Hess, 1970: 170).

At Welamo Soddo, the expulsion of a student leader led to a student strike. In support of Debre Berhane, Nazareth and other secondary school students' demands, secondary school and university students in Addis Ababa presented a comprehensive list of student demands to the government. Their demands included:

1. Compensation for the parents of the dead student in Debre Berhane and the trial of the Debre Berhane police chief.
2. Abolition of national examination fees.
3. Automatic entrance into university for all secondary school graduates.
4. A more just allotment of scholarships given by foreign countries.
5. An increase in the budget for education.
6. Dismissal of the Minister of Education, Akale Work Habte Wolde.
7. Faster economic growth.
8. An end to unemployment.
9. Cuts in money spent on embassies, banquets, ministers' salaries, and visits abroad and its channeling into education.
10. Expulsion of "immoral Indian" and American Peace Corps teachers (see Hess, 1970: 170).

After presenting these demands, university and high school students in Addis Ababa continued boycotting classes. Haile Selassie, in his broadcast to the nation of March 7, 1969, warned the students that the university and high schools in Addis Ababa would be closed if students did not resume classes

within three days. The Ministry of Education also appealed to parents of secondary school students to take their children to schools. This did not seem to frighten the students; in fact, these warnings made them take a determined stand not to return to classes and to continue their agitations. They "circulated pamphlets attacking the King as corrupt and senile and urged peasants, workers and soldiers to revolt" (Hess, 1970: 171).

Convinced that the matter was getting out of hand, on March 25, 1969, the king asked to meet with a delegation of students' councils and asked them to explain to him the reasons for their boycott of classes. The student representatives openly told the king that they would not go to class unless and until the following demands were met: "free and equal education for all Ethiopians; a fair examination system; the replacement of foreign teachers whose moral standards were 'bad' for Ethiopians; reform of the educational system; an increased educational budget that would provide allowances for poor students; and the release of all students who had been detained in the current disorders" (Schwab, 1972: 134). Haile Selassie promised that "students who could not afford to pay tuition would not have to. He said that the cabinet was studying school reforms, but that it would be difficult to provide universal free education and that Ethiopia depended on foreign teachers to staff its schools. He said that the arrested students would be tried through normal legal channels" (Schwab, 1972: 134).

The emperor, however, on September 8, 1969, pardoned all students jailed in the spring demonstrations and those who were suspended from schools for inciting strikes. The Minister of Education, Akale Work Habte Wolde, was transferred to the Ministry of Justice.

In September 1969, classes were started, but agitation against the government and strikes against school authorities and teachers whom students perceived as "unfair" or severe disciplinarians continued. As a result of student strikes

school principals were transferred and some were even beaten to death. In recent years, there have been major strikes by a single grade or an entire secondary school in more than 20 of 58 schools. In some cases there have been repeated strikes. According to Grey, "These are not trivial incidents. The Ministry of Education frequently must settle the strikes" (1970: 190). University students also changed their strategies; instead of openly confronting the government they started circulating pamphlets attacking the government. For instance, in the student paper Struggle they called for the various people of the Empire to be allowed the right to self-determination. A few days after the article "on the question of nationalities" was published, the president of the University Student Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA), Tilahun Gizaw "was killed by two bullets fired from a passing car without number plates" (Youth Action, 1970: 11). As a result of this, tension mounted, all work came to a halt at the university and all secondary schools throughout the country. University and high school students from Addis Ababa schools marched to the university administration office chanting "we want to know how did he die?" (Youth Action, 1970: 11). Then a group of demonstrators broke into the Haile Selassie I Hospital and forcefully took the remains of the student to the University Faculty of Medicine building for a post mortem examination. At this point, the imperial bodyguard arrived, blocked off all approaches to the campus, and started shooting students. The resulting casualties were three dead and more than ten wounded (Gilkes, 1975: 250). The government then shut down the university for most of January 1970, but high school students throughout the country boycotted classes until the end of March 1970.

Generally speaking, the year 1971 was quiet. There were no major demonstrations against the government. But demands for replacement of

teachers, reforms in school policies and programs continued as very important issues in many secondary schools. Due to the endless student unrest in many secondary schools, many highly qualified high school principals either resigned from their posts or applied to the Ministry of Education for a transfer to the central offices. Fresh graduates from the university even declined appointments as high school principals. These factors forced the Ministry of Education to call a general meeting of all high school principals to discuss the problem and find solutions to the existing student unrest. As pinpointed by the secondary school directors who came to the meeting, the internal causes of student unrest were inadequate facilities, absence of communication between students and administrators, fear of failure in examinations, dislike of some subjects and certain teachers. The main external cause of student unrest was political agitation against government programs and policies, manifested in refusal or reluctance to attend flag ceremonies and other ceremonies at the schools (see Ministry of Education, 1971: 44,45). Though the committee on student unrest was aware of the external causes of student dissent in Ethiopian schools, the political situation of the time did not allow the committee to recommend changes in governmental policies. However, with regard to internal causes, it was decided that schools should make the maximum use of available supplies, and recruit and train better teachers. It was also recommended that cordial relations between students and administrators be established.

It is very difficult to determine whether the above recommendations were implemented, but evidence suggests that student unrest in Ethiopian high schools did not decrease. In the spring of 1972, high school students in Addis Ababa implemented an urban-based plan of action designed to accomplish revolutionary objectives. They attacked high bus fares and had considerable

effect in getting price controls in Addis Ababa. When students boycotted classes for more than a month, those students who failed to show up for classes were arrested under Ethiopia's ninety-day detention order. As described by Gilkes "altogether about 1000 were sent to a number of isolated work camps for three-month periods. Most of them were freed by a Liberation Day Amnesty (5 May), but the Government announced thet they could not expect automatic reinstatement" (1975: 250).

In 1973 agitation over the famine in Wello and Tigrai was the main cause for student agitation but the year was over without major disturbances. In 1974, student unrest was revived with great intensity. In February 1974, high school students in Addis Ababa staged a demonstration in support of teachers' demands and particularly in opposition to the proposed education reform (Education Sector Review). They attacked city buses and with University students they participated in every demonstration of workers, and the demonstrating Muslims called for equality of all religions and the establishment of a secular state (see Addis, 1975: 98). In March 1974, many high school and University students in Addis Ababa burned the effigy of then Prime Minister, Endalchacew Makonnen. The students also demanded the arrest and trial of the former Cabinet Ministers.

On September 11, 1974, the Emperor was arrested and the "Derg" (the Provisional Military Administrative Committee) formally assumed power, but students started attacking the Military government and demanded a provisional civilian government; distribution of land to tenants; formation of political parties; freedom of the press, assembly, speech, and demonstration; separation of religion and politics, etc. They also warned the Military Government that until and unless the above and other popular demands of the masses were immediately met they would continue to struggle. The Military Government promised

to fulfill their demands; however, university and high school students from grades eleven and twelve were assigned to work in rural areas in a program called "Development Through Cooperation."

To conclude, from the preceding survey of student activism, it is evident that over the last ten years Ethiopian students have been significantly alienated and have increasingly manifested militancy. This can be observed from demands for land reform, better treatment of beggars, the right to public assembly and demonstration, price controls, demands for educational reform, and attacks on famine conditions. Finally, after a decade of struggle, in 1974, the Ethiopian student movement emerged as a mass movement embracing the peasantry, urban proletariat, and the rank and file of the army and was instrumental in bringing about the downfall of Haile Selassie's government.

## Section IV

## OVERVIEW AND SOME PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE

A historical account of the nature of the socio-economic formation and educational change from the expansion of the Ethiopian Empire southwards and its dependent and subordinate relations to the hegemony of the United States reveals that for six and one half decades there was a closer correspondence between the educational system and the socio-economic structure. Starting in 1965, however, disparity between the economic system and the output of schools became increasingly evident.

During the period 1900-1935 we witnessed: (1) the establishment of politico-economic hegemony over autonomous nationalities whose socio-economic organizations were diametrically opposed to the Shoan military feudal colonists; (2) the expropriation and alienation of land from the masses and the formation of new classes in the incorporated areas;; (3) the mass exodus of the evicted tenants into the incipient urban areas and the predominantly foreign-owned agricultural estates; (4) the appointment of foreigners as advisers in key government posts and (5) the influx of foreign capital and the gradual insertion of the economy into a capitalist economic order.

To mirror the existing class structure and foreign domination of the exchange economy, side by side with the indigenous schools, western-oriented schools were set up, to serve opposing social classes. The urban and rural proletariat on the one hand, and the emerging middle class and the ruling class, on the other hand. In order to develop local cadres who could facilitate a harmonious relationship between the metropolitan and the Ethiopian masses, the school curriculum stressed mastery of foreign languages. Certification on the basis of mastery of foreign languages was used to

perpetuate social differentiation.

Since Italy's annexation of Ethiopia in 1935 was primarily motivated by the lust for raw materials and the creation of markets for Italian manufactured goods, the fascist educational system for the natives was specifically designed to train young Ethiopians in basic technical skills in order to supply the demand for cheap labor and, through political indoctrination, to inculcate a sense of loyalty to the fascist regime. Concomitant with Italy's policy of "divide and rule," separate schools for the different nationalities were established.

After the restoration of Ethiopia's constitutional independence in 1941, similar to the politico-economic sphere, the Ethiopian education system was under the domain of the British. The educational organization was modelled on the British system. A British representative at the Ministry of Education ensured that curricula, textbooks, and teaching personnel were imported from Britain, its colonies and protectorates.

Upon the decline of British imperialism at the end of World War II, however, through economic and military assistance, investments and the establishment of U.S. military bases, Ethiopia was integrated into the sphere of U.S. imperialism. In line with this development and through the advice of American experts and nationals trained in the United States, the Ethiopian education system was restructured to mirror U.S. interests and fulfill the international division of labor. For instance, in the name of educational reforms but primarily to extract surplus, teaching equipment was imported to the country. Middle level technicians for the predominantly foreign owned enterprises were prepared in the various comprehensive secondary schools.

Yet, despite the numerous educational initiatives introduced in the

country, we observed that these were largely ineffective in either providing equal educational opportunity for the school age children or in creating productive employment opportunities for the graduates. We also argued that the economic dependence and heavy reliance on foreign loans (mostly from the United States and multinational agencies and banks) have contributed to two antogonistic forces. On the one hand, they contributed to the country's under-development; but, on the other hand, though modest there was an over-supply of credentialled students relative to the requirements of the existing job structure, thus resulting in a contradiction between the sluggish performance of the economy and the output of schools.

Moreover, in contradistinction to the over simplified dogmatic and mechanistic view that educational institutions fulfill a conservative role and serve in the reproduction of the existing social relations of production, we witnessed in the Ethiopian scene, starting in 1965, that there was a breakdown of correspondence between the economic base and the educational institution located in the superstructure. Though unintended, schools produced alienated, politically conscious amd highly militant students, (see for example, Carnoy and Levin, 1976 amd Weiler, 1972). By reaching back on the socio-economic structure, the out-puts of schooling contributed to the dismantling of the corrupt amd decaying system of the old.

The Military Government (Derg) which replaced the ancien regime in September 1974 has embarked on Socialism(Hibrettesebawinet) to restructure the outmoded socio-economic order. In the economic structure, it has partially nationalized the commanding heights of the economy. To mention only a few, banks, insurance companies, financial intermedaries and industrial enterprises were brought under the control of the state. It abolished private ownership of rural and urban land. According to Ottaway's observation "the nationalization of urban land and rented houses in August 1975, had

profound impact on the society. They effectively destroyed the social basis of the growth of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, although private investments in commerce and small industries was still permitted (1976: 80). In the field of education, the military regime has declared equality in the distribution of education and the school system has been ordered to follow the enunciated socialist ideology.

Scholars in the area have mixed feelings about the content and implementation of the declared socialist policy. Its supporters see the change from the existing remnants of feudalism and capitalistism to the path of socialist orientation as a positive strategy for Ethiopia's development. The critics see it as an ideology forged purposely to promote petty bourgeois class interest. For example Markakis argues that

> Nationalization created a large number of executive posts for the educated petty bourgeoisie, whose members replaced the former owners, managers, and higher level administrators of the nationalized enterprises. In the state administration, the purge of the bureaucractic bourgeoisie created a vacuum at the upper pevels of the apparatus, which was quickly filled with promotion from below and appointments from outside...The self-employed sector of the petty bourgeoisie also gained through the forceful elimination of foreign capital competition (1977: 23). (See also Addis, 1975: 115).

The opponents inside Ethiopia seriously doubt if the measure taken in the name of Ethiopian socialism amounted to socialist revolution. They argue that the workers and peasants have been promised much but given little. Each of these designations might contain an element of truth.

However, we want to stress the fact that even though

some of the initiatives taken by the military government look good in and of themselves, nationalization alone is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the implementation of socialism. However, since an examination of the nature and implementation of Ethiopian socialism is beyond the framework of this study, a clear assessment of the above enumerated issues must await much more research.

Given the existing conditions, we hypothesize that in the long run, contradiction in the Ethiopian socio-economic structure will inevitably arise and recur until and unless:

1. The educational system, through a thoroughly thought-out plan, is articulated with the economic structure to create productive employment opportunities for school leavers. This however requires a long range forecast of the economy and a tailoring of the educational program to meet human resource requirements. Furthermore, it should be made clear that manpower forecasting should not be an isolated exercise, as it is currently being practiced; it should instead be centrally controlled and must be an integral part of the planned socio-economic structure (see Desta, 1977: 121).

2. The dual system of education (that is, private vs. government, vocational vs. academic streams), which perpetuates class differentiations, is abolished and a national curriculum with the focus of producing well rounded people is designed. This is, schools have to be catered to produce students who have integrated mental and manual labor. Academic subjects can be integrated with productive labor when schools establish their own factories and farms, and when factories and agricultural cooperatives establish their own schools (see for example, Lu Ting-Yi, 1962: 124). At all levels of the educational ladder students need to be allowed to partcipate in decision-making that affects their lives in schools. This, however, entails a total restructuring

of the existing organization and of social relations in schools.

3. The workers and peasants not only participate in the process of production, but really feel that the place of work is their own and that they are working for themselves. In short, a real workers' democracy in the production process has to be fully implemented.

4. There is a total mass participation in decisions, through decentralization of authority, so that the Ethiopian people can have complete power to decide their own daily affairs. And;

5. A complete disengagement from the international system of capitalism is fully carried out.

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